

9. Peace and security in Africa

During the period under review, the Security Council held eight meetings in connection with the item entitled “Peace and Security in Africa”. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings, two were held as debates and two convened for the purpose of the adoption of decisions.³¹⁰ The Council held one private meeting to discuss the situation in the north of Ethiopia in relation to which it issued a communique.³¹¹ The Council adopted one resolution and a presidential statement. More information on the meetings, including invitees, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, the Council held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.³¹²

In 2022, the meetings of the Council under this item focused on the activities and role of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa and on the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources.

Regarding the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Council held two briefings on 18 May and 16 November following the reports of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. Council members were provided briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, as well as two civil society representatives.³¹³ The briefings focused primarily on the political and security situation in the region, including the role of the Group of Five on the Sahel. In that regard, on 18 May, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel both took note of the “regrettable” decision by the Malian authorities to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force.³¹⁴ The Assistant Secretary-General for Africa recalled that the security situation was deteriorating in the region and informed the Council that,

³¹⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

³¹¹ See [S/PV.9160](#).

³¹² See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 35.

³¹³ See [S/PV.9035](#) and [S/PV.9194](#). For the reports of the Secretary-General, see [S/2022/382](#) and [S/2022/838](#).

³¹⁴ See [S/PV.9035](#).

in the light of the growing complexity of the crisis facing the Sahel, the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat were jointly conducting a strategic assessment with the objective of strengthening support to the Group of Five for the Sahel and other security and governance initiatives in the region and focusing on innovative ways to mobilize sustainable resourcing for regional initiatives. The Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel assured that the Group would participate in that assessment and hoped that its main components would enable it to better define a better security, governance and cooperation architecture in order to ensure the optimal use of resources. He said that given the way the Joint Force operated and the new context with the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, a review of the concept of its operations had been considered. On the political level, he underscored that the unconstitutional changes that had taken place in three of the five Group of Five countries (Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), as well as the sanctions imposed on some of them, had not contributed to harmony within the subregion. The Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative/Group focused her briefing on the links between climate change and the conflict in the Sahel countries, including the ways in which climate change exacerbated conflict and its impact on women and youth. She made several recommendations to address these effects, including strengthening cooperation with the Group of Five on climate change.

On 16 November, the Assistant Secretary-General regretted that in addition to its financial difficulties, the Joint Force was weakened by the withdrawal of Mali and the second coup d'état in Burkina Faso, further undermining regional cohesion.³¹⁵ The Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, underlining the consequences of Mali's withdrawal, reaffirmed the firm commitment of the Group and the Heads of State to continue its mission and working together and reported about the decisions undertaken on the new format of the Joint Force and its roadmap. He called for Council's attention to the situation in the region, noting the possibility of an even greater threat to international peace and security without a rapid and urgent response. As an independent expert on the Joint Force, Mr. Ramadan presented his analysis on the threats facing the region focusing in particular on the threat of terrorism, He stated that the

³¹⁵ See [S/PV.9194](#).

results achieved by the Force seemed to be mixed, or inadequate, and outlined the limitations and weaknesses that it was facing of a political, financial, logistical and institutional nature, including the lack of a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter by the Council.

Throughout the discussions that ensued following the briefings, Council members deliberated on the political, security, socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Sahel countries. In that regard, Council members called on members of the Group of Five for the Sahel, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, to restore constitutional order.

Council members addressed security challenges in the region, including the expansion and spread of terrorism to the coastal region of the Gulf of Guinea.³¹⁶ Some members discussed the activities of the Wagner Group as another potential source of insecurity in the region.³¹⁷ Council members discussed the impact of the conclusion of Operation Barkhane in November 2022 on the security situation in the region.³¹⁸ They deliberated on the ways to combat insecurity in the Sahel, including through improving governance and addressing socioeconomic challenges as underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and corruption, as well as climate change.³¹⁹

Council members often addressed the role of regional and subregional organizations, most notably the African Union and ECOWAS, in the peace and political processes in the countries of the Sahel.³²⁰ Some took note of or welcomed the joint strategic assessment of security and development in the Sahel.³²¹ The representatives of Norway and Ghana, speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya, underscored that the Panel should build on existing

³¹⁶ See [S/PV.9035](#), France, China, India and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9194](#), France, Ireland, China, Brazil, Albania and India.

³¹⁷ See [S/PV.9194](#), France, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom, Albania, Norway.

³¹⁸ See [S/PV.9194](#), France, Mexico, Brazil and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

³¹⁹ See [S/PV.9035](#), Albania, India, United Kingdom, Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, and United States; and [S/PV.9194](#), United States, Ireland, Mexico, China, United Arab Emirates, Norway and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

³²⁰ See [S/PV.9035](#), Albania, India, Mexico, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), and United States; and [S/PV.9194](#), Ireland, Russian Federation, Mexico, United Kingdom, and United Arab Emirates.

³²¹ See [S/PV.9035](#), Albania, Brazil, China, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), and United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV.9194](#), France, United States, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom, China, Brazil, Albania, and Norway.

initiatives, including the efforts of the Group of Five, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and the Nouakchott process.³²²

The activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five in the context of the regional security architecture were frequently addressed by all Council members in 2022. Council members discussed the consequences of the decision by Mali to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force.³²³ Some emphasized the need for support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to the Joint Force³²⁴ and predictable support through United Nations-assessed contributions.³²⁵

Concerning the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, at a meeting held on 31 May 2022,³²⁶ the Council adopted resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#) in which it, *inter alia*, stressed the primary responsibility of the States of the Gulf of Guinea to counter the piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and address their underlying causes,³²⁷ and called upon Member States in the region to criminalize the piracy and armed robbery under their domestic laws.³²⁸ The Council requested the Secretary-General to report, within five months and on an exceptional basis in advance of the 10-year anniversary of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes, including any possible and potential linkages with terrorism in West and Central Africa and the Sahel, as well as the United Nations support and contributions and any recommendations for further supporting and enhancing national efforts and regional and international cooperation towards combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region.³²⁹

³²² See [S/PV.9194](#). For discussions on the role of regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union and ECOWAS, in the pacific settlement of disputes, see part VIII, sect. II.B.

³²³ See [S/PV.9035](#), France, Albania, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ireland and United States; and [S/PV.9194](#), France, United States, Mexico, Brazil, Albania, India, Norway and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

³²⁴ See [S/PV.9035](#), France, Albania, Brazil, China and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9194](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

³²⁵ See [S/PV.9035](#), France, India and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya); and [S/PV.9194](#), France, India and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya). For more information on peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, see part VIII, sect. III.

³²⁶ See [S/PV.9050](#).

³²⁷ Resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#), para 2.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

On 22 November, the Council held a briefing in which the Assistant Secretary-General presented a report of the Secretary-General further to the request included in resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#) on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes.³³⁰ She reported on the steady decline in instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea.³³¹ She elaborated on the changing dynamics of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and their causes, including youth unemployment and inadequate access to public services, as well as regional and international initiatives aimed at addressing maritime challenges. She stressed the need to fully operationalize the maritime security architecture set out in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. She reported that there was no firm evidence to suggest any potential or possible linkages between terrorists and pirate groups, but suggested addressing the underlying social, economic and environmental challenges faced by communities in the region to contain both threats. Following the Assistant Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime made several recommendations to improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, including by supporting Member States in developing their rule of law capacities and legal frameworks, remaining agile and adaptable in responding to shifting trends and emerging threats related to piracy in the region and addressing its root causes. In addition, the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission briefed the Council on the achievements in terms of combatting piracy in the region, including in the context of Yaoundé architecture but also in terms of bilateral cooperation. She recalled other ongoing crimes in the region, impacting the well-being of coastal populations and the economic well-being of Governments, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, oil theft and pollution. Lastly, the Maritime Planning Officer of the African Union provided a briefing focusing on the nature of maritime crime in the region and regional and international efforts aimed at improving maritime security in the areas of information-sharing, joint training and exercises.

Further to the briefings, Council members discussed the different threats to the peace and security posed by piracy and other crimes at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Speakers also addressed

³³⁰ See [S/2022/818](#).

³³¹ See [S/PV.9198](#).

the humanitarian, socioeconomic and environmental impact of these crimes,³³² and their underlying causes, including poverty, unemployment, corruption, climate change and food insecurity.³³³ Participants addressed the role played by regional organizations, including ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, in the resolution and prevention of piracy and other maritime crimes.³³⁴ Some took note of the recommendations provided by the Peacebuilding Commission.³³⁵ The representative of the Russian Federation called for the establishment of a specialized entity under the auspices of the United Nations responsible for addressing the entire spectrum of issues related to combating maritime crime.³³⁶

Regarding the issue of capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa, the Council held an open debate on 8 and 9 August 2022,³³⁷ at the initiative of China which held the presidency for the month.³³⁸ In his briefing to the Council, the African Union Commissioner elaborated on the security threats facing the region, most notably violent extremism, terrorism, climate change and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, as well as the means of combating these threats.³³⁹ He stressed the need for demonstrable joint transformative leadership between the Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council and the need to strengthen democracies. The Special Adviser on Africa to the Secretary-General briefed the Council on the combination of internal and external factors that undermined the capacities of African countries to prevent and address violence. She recommended investing, inter alia, in institutional infrastructure to build the capacities needed to tackle the internal causes of violence and strengthening cooperation between peacekeeping missions and national and local authorities, which, from the institution-building and security perspectives, could create opportunities for increasing the State presence and enhancing the delivery of services, preventing gaps that could be leveraged by terrorist groups and non-State actors.³⁴⁰ The Chair of the Peacebuilding

³³² Ibid., Norway, Gabon, India, Albania, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, and European Union.

³³³ Ibid., Gabon, United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, China, Mexico and Ghana.

³³⁴ Ibid., Norway, Gabon, India, United States, France, Albania, Brazil, China and European Union.

³³⁵ Ibid., United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Ghana, and Germany.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ See [S/PV.9106](#) and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For further detail on the discussion see part VIII, sect. II.

³³⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 August 2022 ([S/2022/592](#)).

³³⁹ Ibid., pp. 2-4. For more information on discussions concerning threats to regional and international peace and security, see part VII, sect. I.B.

³⁴⁰ See [S/PV.9106](#).

Commission focused her briefing on the changing conflict dynamics and elaborated on the engagements of the Peacebuilding Commission in the field of capacity-building in Africa.³⁴¹

In the ensuing discussion, speakers deliberated on the challenges to and identified ways for improving capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa. Speakers addressed the roles of regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union,³⁴² as well as the United Nations, including the Security Council³⁴³ and the Peacebuilding Commission³⁴⁴ in the efforts aimed at sustaining peace on the African continent. The need to strengthen the cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations, including the Council, to in the context of capacity-building was frequently underlined by Member States.³⁴⁵

Participants also discussed the nexus between climate change and security,³⁴⁶ as well as between sustainable development and peace and security.³⁴⁷ Among some of the proposals put forward for strengthening capacity-building for sustaining peace, speakers made reference to increasing funding for peacebuilding;³⁴⁸ strengthening institution-building and the rule of law,³⁴⁹ and involving women, youth and/or civil society in peacebuilding efforts, including in decision-making, public policy implementation and security sector reform.³⁵⁰ Some speakers commented

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² See [S/PV.9106](#), Ireland, India, Mexico, Norway, United States, Russian Federation, Ghana, Albania, Senegal, South Africa, and Algeria; [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Republic of Korea, Germany, European Union, Malta, Portugal, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, Italy, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Australia, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, Argentina and Bangladesh.

³⁴³ See [S/PV.9106](#), Switzerland; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Ethiopia.

³⁴⁴ See [S/PV.9106](#), Kenya, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Brazil, Norway, France, Senegal, Egypt, Japan, and Algeria; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Republic of Korea, Poland, Portugal, Ecuador, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, Italy, Morocco, Rwanda, Australia, Equatorial Guinea and Bangladesh.

³⁴⁵ See [S/PV.9106](#), Gabon, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, Egypt, South Africa and Algeria; [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Portugal, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia and Equatorial Guinea. For more information on the discussions concerning the relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, see part VIII, sect. II.

³⁴⁶ See [S/PV.9106](#), Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Ghana, Albania, France and Switzerland; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Poland, and Canada.

³⁴⁷ See [S/PV.9106](#), China, Gabon, Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, and Switzerland; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Malta, Thailand, Italy, Morocco, Slovenia, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, and Argentina.

³⁴⁸ See [S/PV.9106](#), Kenya, Switzerland, Egypt and South Africa; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Germany, European Union, Portugal, Ecuador, Mozambique, Netherlands) and Morocco, Slovenia, Australia, Rwanda, and Tunisia.

³⁴⁹ See [S/PV.9106](#).

³⁵⁰ See [S/PV.9106](#), Ireland, Gabon, Mexico, United Kingdom, Brazil, Ghana, Albania, France, Switzerland, South Africa and Algeria; and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Republic of Korea, European Union, Malta, Portugal, Canada,

on the impact of Council-imposed sanctions in relation to maintaining and sustaining peace in Africa.³⁵¹

On 31 August 2022, the Council issued a presidential statement in relation to capacity-building for sustaining peace. In the statement, the Council recognized the need to step up capacity-building support to African countries and emphasized the importance of providing capacity support, at the request of and in close consultation with the country in question to improve the rule of law, strengthen national institutions, extend legitimate State authority, build governance, promote and protect human rights, enhance social cohesion and inclusiveness.³⁵² The Council further highlighted the importance of, inter alia, sharing best practices and providing financial support on promoting inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes; supporting socioeconomic development for sustaining peace in Africa; and capacity support and institutional training to address through a holistic approach the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.³⁵³ The Council encouraged continued development and application of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes through regional and subregional arrangements and welcomed the continuing important efforts and enhanced role of the African Union, sub-regional organizations and regional mechanisms in peace operations in accordance with Security Council resolutions.³⁵⁴

Concerning the issue of strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources, the Council held a high-level debate on 6 October 2022, at the initiative of Gabon which held the presidency for the month.³⁵⁵ In her briefing to the Council, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime highlighted the importance of understanding the links between organized crime and terrorism in Africa through data collection, pointing out that illegal exploitation of minerals provided armed

Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic Countries), Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Morocco, Slovenia, Slovakia, Tunisia and Bangladesh.

³⁵¹ See [S/PV.9106](#), China, Kenya, United States, Russian Federation, Equatorial Guinea and France. For the discussions on the role of sanctions and their unintended consequences, see part VII, sect. III and IX, respectively.

³⁵² See [S/PRST/2022/6](#), third and fourth paragraphs.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, sixth, thirteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, nineteenth and twentieth paragraphs. For more information, see part VIII, sect. II.

³⁵⁵ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 September 2022 ([S/2022/728](#)).

groups and terrorists with significant source of revenue.³⁵⁶ She briefed about the Office's programmes to prevent and respond to crimes against the environment, illegal mining and trafficking, including its youth-driven peacebuilding projects. The African Union Commissioner reported about a number of initiatives deployed by the African Union, including the establishment of national counter-terrorism fusion centres, national financial intelligence units and law enforcement at the national level and underlined a need for enhanced cooperation in terms of capacity-building and the transfer of knowledge in favour of countries in post-conflict situations and strengthening the sanctions regimes against terrorist individuals, groups or organizations through a close collaboration with the Council. The civil society briefer elaborated on the complex nature of illicit trafficking by non-State and terrorist groups as well as the tools for combating the problem. In order to strengthen the fight against the financing of non-State armed groups through trafficking in natural resources, he suggested modernizing sanctions regimes, breaking up of the criminal networks within administrations and armed forces, and improving due diligence processes.

Further to the briefings, Council members discussed the nature of the threat emanating from the illicit trafficking in natural resources to finance terrorist activities. In that regard, speakers addressed the linkages between the exploitation of natural resources and conflict,³⁵⁷ and the utilization of natural resources to finance terrorism, including through the acquisition of arms, ammunition, and mining concessions.³⁵⁸ Some participants focused on the threats posed by the activities of specific groups, most notably ISIS (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida,³⁵⁹ Al-Shabaab,³⁶⁰ as well as the Wagner Group.³⁶¹ Regarding the proposals to mitigate the problem, speakers focused on the international and regional cooperation and support for African countries and on how the United Nations, including the Security Council,³⁶² as well as regional organizations, notably the

³⁵⁶ See [S/PV.9147](#).

³⁵⁷ Ibid., Gabon, United States, India, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Brazil, and Central African Republic.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation, Mexico, Norway, Kenya, Brazil and Central African Republic.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., United States, India and Kenya.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., United Arab Emirates, China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, Kenya and Brazil.

³⁶¹ Ibid., United States, United Kingdom, France and Norway.

³⁶² Ibid., Gabon, United Kingdom, Kenya and Brazil.

African Union³⁶³ and ECCAS,³⁶⁴ could support the fight against the exploitation of natural resources. The role and effectiveness of Council-imposed sanctions as means of curbing the trafficking in natural resources was also addressed by several speakers.³⁶⁵ Some speakers further suggested the need to address the shortcomings in governance, institutional frameworks and the rule of law.³⁶⁶

Meetings: Peace and security in Africa

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9035 18 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2022/382)			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative/ Group	13 Council members ^a , all invitees	
S/PV.9050 31 May 2022		Draft resolution (S/2022/62) submitted by 37 Member States ^b	29 Member States ^c		7 Council members ^d	Resolution 2634 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9106 ; S/PV.9106 (Resumption 1) 8 and 9 August 2022	Capacity-building for sustaining peace Letter dated 1 August 2022 from the Permanent Representative of		30 Member States ^e	African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Special Adviser on Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General and Chair of the Peacebuilding	All Council members, all invitees ^f	

³⁶³ Ibid., Gabon, India, United Arab Emirates, China and United Kingdom.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., India.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., United States, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Ireland, Norway, Brazil and Central African Republic.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., India, China, United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, France, Norway, Brazil, Central African Republic and Kenya.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9122 31 August 2022	China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2022/592)			Commission, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European to the United Nations	One Council member (China)	S/PRST/2022/6
S/PV.9147 6 October 2022	Strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources Letter dated 30 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2022/728)		Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Senegal	Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Regional Director for East Africa and Representative of the Institute for Security Studies to the African Union, Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members ^a , four rule 37 invitees ^b , all rule 39 invitees	
S/PV.9160 (closed) 21 October 2022			Ethiopia	Director, Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members ^a , all invitees	
S/PV.9194 16 November 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2022/838)			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, civil society representative	13 Council members ^a , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9198 22 November 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes (S/2022/818)		Germany, Nigeria	Chargé d'affaires of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, Maritime Planning Officer of the African Union Commission	All Council members, all invitees ^j	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b Albania, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia and United States.

^c Angola, Benin, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gambia, Guinea, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo and Tunisia.

^d Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.

^e Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malta, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Thailand and Ukraine.

^f The African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Special Adviser on Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General participated by videoconference.

^g Gabon was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ghana was represented by its Minister for National Security. India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs. United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State.

^h Central African Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea and Morocco.

ⁱ Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^j Germany (on behalf of: G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea).