

the conflict. The appeal for respect for the territorial integrity of non-belligerent States should have been extended to include countries at war; as it stood, it left the door open for foreign intervention in countries party to the conflict.'

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information of Kuwait stated that, having adopted a resolution, the Council must do everything possible to ensure its implementation. Kuwait thanked the Secretary-General and anticipated that he would follow up on the implementation of the resolution, in which he could be sure of their constructive co-operation.

NOTES

- ¹ S/ 16574. *OR. 39th yr.. Suppl. for April-June 1984.*
² For details, see chap. III of the present *Supplement.*
³ 2541st mtg.
⁴ 2543rd mtg.
⁵ 2545th mtg.
⁶ S/16594, adopted without change as resolution 552 (1984).
⁷ 2546th mtg.

33. **LETTER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1984 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NICARAGUA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter' dated 4 September 1984 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Nicaragua requested an urgent **meeting** of the Council to be convened immediately to examine the situation created by the new escalation of aggression directed against his country.

At its 2557th meeting, on 7 September 1984, the Council included the letter in its agenda and considered it at the same meeting.

The representative of Nicaragua expressed concern about the increasing involvement of mercenaries of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the no longer covert war against his country. Nicaragua had been alerting the international community and the Government and people of the United States to the consequences of the increasing involvement. In that regard, the speaker furnished numerous relevant examples including the dispatch of mercenaries, the transport of military equipment, training and direct participation in combat with Contras, the constant holding of military and naval manoeuvres in the waters close to Nicaragua and the building of airports and other military installations in Central America; and permanent reconnaissance, in other words spy flights, over Nicaraguan territory by United States aircraft.

The permanent United States military presence in Central America amounted to 1,400 United States soldiers on seven United States bases. Political solutions seemed increasingly difficult to achieve. High-level spokesmen of the United States Administration, including President Reagan himself, Secretary of State Shultz and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, continued to threaten the Sandinist People's Revolution and the Government of National **Reconstruc-**

tion. The sole objective of those statements was to isolate Nicaragua internationally and to prepare the political terrain for the invasion. Various United States officials, including the President, had on several occasions made statements in which they did not discard the possibility of direct intervention in Central America, including Nicaragua. The United States constituted a real threat to the security of the Sandinist People's Republic, which the United States was openly attempting to destroy through a war of aggression.⁷

The representative of the United States rejected the statement by the representative of Nicaragua and stated that the United States was not trying to overthrow the Sandinista Government. He alleged that United States relations with Nicaragua had deteriorated because, instead of keeping their promises about human rights and pluralistic democracy, the Sandinistas had developed increasingly close military ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union, tightened their internal repression, had supported guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador and terrorism in Honduras and Costa Rica and had continued an extensive military build-up that threatened the security of their neighbours.²

The representative of Nicaragua in his reply mentioned that his country was concerned and grieved to see the United States, the greatest empire in the world, applying a double standard: that it was going through the motions of seeking a negotiated settlement to the problems of Central America while at the same time committing acts of aggression against Nicaragua. Such duplicity revealed the lack of **sincerity** on the part of the United States **Government**.²

The representative of the Soviet Union called the American declaration that the United States did not intend to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua was fallacious from beginning to end, because in parallel with that and other similar statements the United States had **virtually** openly continued to finance, arm, train and send mercenaries to **Nicaraguan territory**. The reason for acts of intervention by the United States against Latin American countries was its consistent policy of not allowing the autonomous, economic, political and social development of Latin America and attempting to impose on Latin American countries the kind of system preferred by the United States.²

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- ¹ S/16731, *OR, 39th yr.. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1984.*
² 2557th mtg.

34. **LETTER DATED 3 OCTOBER 1984 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter' dated 3 October 1984, the representative of the Lao People's Democratic **Republic** requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the attack on and occupation of three Lao villages by Thailand and the resulting tense situation along the border between the two countries.

At its 2558th meeting, on 9 October 1984, the Council included the item in its agenda and invited the representatives of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.² The Council considered the matter at the same meeting.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic stated that on 6 June 1984 several battalions of the Thai Army had attacked Lao territory and occupied three Lao villages. Thailand was taking measures to absorb and assimilate the villages, forcibly isolating them from the surrounding area and abusing the villagers. It justified its claim to the villages on the basis of a map drawn up jointly by the Thai and United States Armies in 1978, despite a footnote on the map stating that the frontier lines it represented were not to be considered official. He claimed that Thai efforts to force a re-examination of the frontier in the area of the three villages were designed to create a precedent for a revision of the entire border, in fulfilment of Thai expansionist aims, despite the fact that there had been no border dispute between the two countries since the frontier had been laid down in 1904-1907.

In negotiations with a Lao delegation, Thailand had initially agreed to withdraw from the villages but had ended by unilaterally breaking off the negotiations. Recently, the Thai Foreign Minister had informed the General Assembly that the Thai Government would withdraw its military presence from the villages, but the Thai statement was untrustworthy as it contained no guarantee and no timetable, no acknowledgement of Lao sovereignty and no commitment to restore the status quo as it existed before 6 June by removing the Thai administration, police force, para-military force etc. He declared that Thailand must withdraw its troops and administrative personnel totally and unconditionally, return villagers who had been forcibly taken to Thailand, compensate villagers for losses of life and property and restore the situation that had prevailed prior to the occupation. The Lao Government appealed to the Council to urge Thailand to respond quickly and positively to the Lao demands and to abide by the Charter in its international relations.⁴

The representative of Thailand pointed out that the villages in question were extremely small, impoverished and remotely situated, and stated that in the view of his Government the issue did not deserve the attention of the Council. He related that the matter had begun when a Thai road-building crew had been harassed by Lao soldiers inside Thai territory, eventually prompting Thailand to send troops to protect the crew and ensure the continuation of the project. He noted that a study of available maps gave Thai authorities reasonable grounds to believe that the villages in dispute were partly or wholly inside Thai territory.

The two sides had entered talks but had been unable to reach general agreement, although they had agreed on the watershed principle. Thailand had then sent a survey team to the area to determine the exact boundary line and had announced its willingness to accept an independent survey to verify Thai findings, but harassment by the Lao side had prevented completion of the survey. Now, in the interest of maintaining good-neighbourly relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Thailand had withdrawn its troops from the villages. The Lao People's

Democratic Republic should now have no reason for objecting to a joint technical team establishing the boundary, but if it did Thailand was prepared to ask the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission. Meanwhile, both sides should refrain from assaults on the other, including verbal assaults, and should prevent any third-party interference in what was a bilateral issue.

While Thailand naturally wished to renegotiate the border between the two countries, the original boundaries having been established at a time when the Siamese Government had been in no position to resist encroachment by the French colonial administration in Indo-China, successive Thai Governments had given precedence to the larger interest of maintaining good-neighbourliness; Thailand did not want a single inch of Lao territory or a single Lao national and looked forward to a future of peaceful and constructive relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic.⁴

Exercising his right of reply, the representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic stated that his Government would not agree to a survey of the area because it had already submitted definitive proof of Lao sovereignty. Doing so would mean giving up that sovereignty, failing to recognize the France-Siamese treaties and thus the inviolability of the entire border, and so destabilizing not only Laos, but Cambodia as well. He further stated that Thailand had not, so far, removed its troops from the area; instead, it had started bringing in reinforcements, forcibly conscripting young people, violating Lao airspace with reconnaissance planes and indiscriminately firing cannon at neighbouring villages. He requested that the Council remain seized of the issue until the matter had been resolved.⁴

NOTES

¹ S/16765, OR. 39th yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1984*.

² 2558th mtg. For details, see chap. III of the present Supplement.

³ ORGA, 39th sess., plen. mtgs., 17th mtg., para. 61.

⁴ 2558th mtg.

35. LETTER DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1984 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NICARAGUA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

By letter¹ dated 9 November 1984 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Nicaragua requested that the Council be convened as a matter of urgency for the purpose of considering the very serious situation created by the escalation of acts of aggression, the repeated threats and new acts of provocation fostered by the United States Government.

At its 2562nd meeting, on 9 November 1984, the Council included the item in its agenda and considered it at the same meeting.

The representative of Nicaragua gave an account of numerous military provocations by the United States against his country. He referred to various American official statements and press reports containing serious threats based on unfounded and controversial suppositions. The announcements in