



Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council

25th Supplement

2022

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Security Council Affairs Division
Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch

Part VIII

Regional arrangements

Contents

Introductory note.....	3
I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items	7
Note	7
A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter.....	7
B. Discussion on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter	9
II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes	26
Note	26
A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes	26
B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements	28
III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements	35
Note	35
A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements ..	35
B. Discussion concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.	43
IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements	49
A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements	49
B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements	50
V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security	56
Note	56
A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements	56
B. Discussion concerning the reporting by regional arrangements.....	59
C. Communications concerning the reporting by regional arrangements.....	60

Introductory note

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

During the period under review, in its decisions, the Council reiterated that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, was significant to improving collective security. The Council recognized that regional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts, owing to their knowledge of the region, which could be of benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of conflicts. In particular, the Council welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation between them in a variety of fields. The Council emphasized the importance to strengthen trilateral cooperation and coordination between the United Nations, the African Union and the League on cross-regional peace and security issues. In addition, the Council recognized the role of regional and subregional organizations played in the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acknowledged their perspectives on the need to minimize adverse humanitarian effects of sanctions regimes.

In 2022, the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council held their seventh joint informal seminar and sixteenth annual joint

¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the *Repertoire*, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations as well as other international organizations.

consultative meeting in New York on 13 and 14 October, respectively, during which they discussed how to strengthen African Union and United Nations peacekeeping in Africa, the situation in West Africa and the Sahel, the Great Lakes region, as well as the application of sanctions in conflict situations in Africa.² In addition to the African Union and the League of Arab States, engagement with other regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Collective Security and Treaty Organization, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe featured prominently in Council discussions.

Discussions in the Council focused on various aspects of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including on the role of regional organizations in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-terrorism and peacebuilding. Council members and other Member States further exchanged views on the principles underlying that cooperation, including complementarity, subsidiarity, and the comparative advantage of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, practical modalities for joint engagement and the need for predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African Union-led peace support operations.

In connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council highlighted in its decisions the important role played by regional and subregional organizations in the prevention and mediation of conflicts and the promotion of inclusive peace processes and reconciliation, including, among others, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, the East Africa Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the League of Arab States and the Southern African Development Community. During their discussions, Council members exchanged views on the engagement of regional and subregional organizations in addressing the situations in the Central African Republic and the Central Africa region, the

² See [S/2022/768](#) and [A/77/2](#). For more information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008-2009 to 2021*, part II, sect. I.C.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes region, Mali, West Africa and the Sahel region, and the Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, they discussed the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and the regional economic communities on capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council authorized the reconfiguration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and renewed the authorization of the European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Force in Kosovo continued to operate without any decisions taken with respect to its mandate. The Council also discussed the mandate and United Nations support for ATMIS and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.

As in previous periods, the Council authorized enforcement action by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations, such as in relation to Libya and Somalia, and continued to request reporting by regional organizations, particularly on the implementation of mandates of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and on cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2022 is set out in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings. Section I examines the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning agenda items of a thematic nature. Section II deals with the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. Section III covers the practice of the Council relating to its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV describes the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement action by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V refers to the reporting on the activities of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter. This section also includes reference to relevant communications of the Council.

I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items

Note

Section I examines the practice of the Security Council in 2022 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII and subsection B covers discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII.

A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in one decision of a thematic nature. In a presidential statement adopted on 23 March 2022 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council reiterated that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, was significant to improve collective security.³ The Council recognized that regional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts, owing to their knowledge of the region, which could be of benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of conflicts.⁴ The Council welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation and strategic coordination between them in the fields of, among others, conflict early warning and prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, sustaining peace, promoting respect for international law and the

³ [S/PRST/2022/1](#), third paragraph.

⁴ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

Charter, addressing root causes of conflict, enhancing safety and security at sea, preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, and building resilience to resist incitement.⁵ The Council also recognized the importance of cooperation in sustainable development, comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies, including poverty eradication, food security and water management, disaster risk reduction, and desertification and drought management in the Arab region.⁶ The Council emphasized the importance to strengthen trilateral cooperation and coordination between the United Nations, the African Union and the League of Arab States on cross-regional peace and security issues and encouraged consultations between them.⁷

In terms of the modalities of their engagement, the Council expressed support for the holding of an annual briefing by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, an annual informal meeting with the Council of the League, and an informal meeting with representatives of the Arab Summit Troika and the Secretary-General of the League, on the margins of the General Assembly high-level segment.⁸ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a brief report on the implementation of the presidential statement and on further ways of strengthening institutional relations and cooperation between the two organizations.⁹

The Council also referred to the role of regional and subregional organization in the maintenance of international peace and security in two other decisions adopted under thematic items related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the use of sanctions. In resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), the Council welcomed efforts by regional and subregional organizations in supporting Member States in their implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and recognized the role they could play in facilitating the implementation of the resolution by Member States in their respective regions.¹⁰ In resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#), adopted under the item entitled “General issues related to sanctions”, the Council expressed its readiness to review, adjust and terminate its sanctions regimes taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground and

⁵ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

⁶ Ibid., eighth paragraph.

⁷ Ibid., nineteenth paragraph.

⁸ Ibid., sixteenth and seventeenth paragraphs.

⁹ Ibid., twenty-first paragraph.

¹⁰ Resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#), fifteenth and sixteenth preambular paragraphs.

the need to minimize unintended adverse humanitarian effects, and acknowledged the perspectives of regional and subregional organizations in this regard.¹¹

B. Discussion on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter

In 2022, Council members and other Member States discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security under several thematic items, including “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”,¹² “Children and armed conflict”,¹³ “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,¹⁴ “General issues relating to sanctions”,¹⁵ “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”,¹⁶ “Maintenance of international peace and security”,¹⁷ “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,¹⁸ “Threats to international peace and security”,¹⁹ “United Nations peacekeeping operations”²⁰ and “Women and peace and security”.²¹ The most extensive discussions were held under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, particularly on cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (see case 1), the League of Arab States (see case 2) and the African Union (see case 4), as well as under the items entitled “Women and peace and security”, focusing on partnerships in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda (see case 3), and “Threats to international peace and security” regarding counter-terrorism efforts in Africa (see case 5).

¹¹ Resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#), eighth preambular paragraph.

¹² See [S/PV.8992](#).

¹³ See [S/PV.9096](#) and [S/PV.9096 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁴ See [S/PV.8967](#), [S/PV.9001](#), [S/PV.9065](#) and [S/PV.9149](#).

¹⁵ See [S/PV.8962](#).

¹⁶ See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁷ See [S/PV.9112](#), [S/PV.9220](#) and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁸ See [S/PV.9101](#), [S/PV.9181](#) and [S/PV.9181 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁹ See [S/PV.9150](#) and [S/PV.9188](#).

²⁰ See [S/PV.9123](#).

²¹ See [S/PV.8989](#), [S/PV.8989 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9064](#), [S/PV.9064 \(Resumption 1\)](#) and [S/PV.9158](#).

Case 1

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 14 March, the Council held a briefing under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” to discuss relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).²² At the outset of the meeting, Council members were briefed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the CSTO.²³ In his briefing, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that the founders of the United Nations understood that no single organization could alone ensure peace, security and development in a complex and rapidly changing world and that this required partnership across all levels – from the local, to the regional and global. He recalled that one of the main goals of his “Our Common Agenda” report was to build, by encouraging partnerships, a more inclusive and effective multilateralism that operated more like a network.²⁴ To that end, the Secretary-General indicated that he planned to continue holding annual meetings with all leaders of regional organizations, guided by the Charter and other instruments of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The Secretary-General of the CSTO reaffirmed the commitment of his organization to developing friendly and mutually acceptable relations with third countries and international organizations to maintain peace and stability based on the principles of international law, the rejection of confrontation and an embrace of lasting solutions through political and diplomatic means, in line with the provisions of the Charter.

In their statements, Council members and participating Member States expressed support for strengthening cooperation between the United Nations, including the Council, with regional and subregional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter and addressed some of the principles that should underlie such cooperation. The representative of China stated that the promotion of cooperation in the field of peace and security between the United Nations and

²² See [S/PV.8967](#).

²³ For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 36, “Cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.

²⁴ See [A/75/982](#).

regional and subregional organizations under Chapter VIII was conducive to strengthening the universality and effectiveness of collective security mechanisms and improving the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the Russian Federation, as echoed by the representative of Tajikistan, held the view that regional organizations had to complement United Nations efforts within their areas of responsibility, as they were, in most cases, more familiar with the situation on the ground. The representative of France stated that the entire point of Chapter VIII was the recognition that regional organizations were closest to the ground, the first to witness security crises and knew the deep roots involved and effective solutions to resolve and prevent them. The representative of India recalled that Article 52 of the Charter encouraged the settlement of disputes through regional arrangements and that such organizations were uniquely placed to provide better solutions to conflicts in their regions. The representative of Brazil stated that the United Nations and regional organizations should not only complement each other, but also combine efforts to develop effective tools for conflict prevention, mediation, crisis management and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Speakers also reflected on and expressed differing views on the first deployment by the CSTO of a peacekeeping force following civil unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022. Several delegations were of the view that the CSTO played a decisive and positive role in stabilizing the situation in Kazakhstan.²⁵ The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and the representative of Kazakhstan emphasized that the operation, the objective of which was to provide peacekeeping assistance and maintain stability in the country, was conducted further to the request of the President of Kazakhstan and in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty on Collective Security.

Other delegations expressed concern with the violence in Kazakhstan and maintained that regional interventions had to be conducted in full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.²⁶ The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that regional deployments had to be proportionate in any use of force and that Kazakhstan's sovereignty had to be respected, adding that this was at the very heart of the Charter and essential to the work of the Council. The

²⁵ China, Gabon, Armenia and Kazakhstan.

²⁶ United Kingdom, France, United States, Ireland and Albania.

representative of the United States expressed concern that the CSTO deployment was sought before sustained efforts at national dialogue, reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of disputes took place. The representative of Ghana opined that closer collaboration between the United Nations and the CSTO on any future deployment would enhance the Council's accountability over actions for regional peace and security.

More generally, the representatives of France and the United Kingdom underscored that regional partnerships had to be based on the principles and purposes of the Charter. The representatives of Albania, France and the United Kingdom emphasized the need for cooperating with regional organizations, including their peacekeeping forces, to respect human rights and ensure the participation of women. The representative of Albania further stated that regional organizations should work in a transparent manner, follow clear rules and principles, and that any country must be able to decide in full freedom on the regional body it wished to join, in accordance with the aims and aspirations of its people. The representative of the United Kingdom viewed the rule of law as a key component of institutional cooperation with regional organizations, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. In addition to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as common objectives of cooperation, the representative of Brazil cited the promotion of peace, reconciliation, stability, freedom and economic prosperity. While noting that when there was good cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations emerging crises could be effectively contained, the representative of Kenya stated that whenever organizations "read from different scripts" or took unilateral actions, conflicts became unnecessarily complex, protracted, internationalized and more destructive. He added that in a globalized world where many security challenges were shared, regular exchanges between regional and subregional organizations and the United Nations contributed to building collaborative frameworks to deal with transregional threats such as terrorism, piracy and sea-based crime. The representative of the United Arab Emirates called for an enhanced inclusion of regional actors in Council discussions and for the systematic inclusion of regional perspectives in its consideration of items on its agenda.

Case 2

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 22 March, at the initiative of the United Arab Emirates, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,²⁷ the Council held its annual briefing on cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.²⁸ The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and Ms. Raza Farhan Alaqil, a civil society representative.²⁹

In the discussions that followed the briefings, Council members and the representative of Yemen, who spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States, recognized the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. Several speakers noted that the League, with its deep knowledge and experience, possessed a comparative advantage in addressing challenges to peace and security in the Arab region.³⁰ The representative of Gabon stated that regional and subregional organizations were, through their regional mechanisms, able to mobilize and deploy rapidly on the ground. The representative of Ghana encouraged greater diplomatic engagement by the League in the conflicts in the region, in collaboration with the Council, through its conflict resolution tools and strategies. The representative of Kenya stated that cooperation between the Council and the League had to be more ambitious if it was to be fit for purpose. He further opined that it could well be that Chapter VIII of the Charter and its embrace of the contribution of regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security was what would ultimately rescue multilateralism.

Some delegations underscored the importance of regional ownership of peace and security efforts and the need to prevent foreign interference. The Minister of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab

²⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 17 March 2022 ([S/2022/240](#)).

²⁸ See [S/PV.9001](#).

²⁹ For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 35, “Cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.

³⁰ United Arab Emirates, Ghana, China, Gabon and Yemen (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

Emirates stressed the need to adhere to the principle of seeking “Arab solutions to Arab issues”, which required an end to foreign interference in Arab affairs. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that cooperation with the League could contribute to the peaceful settlement of existing disputes without external interference, while respecting the interests of all parties concerned, in accordance with the norms and provisions of international law. Noting that the League had raised its voice in favour of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member States through moderation and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the representative of Brazil opined that it was essential for the Council to draw on the League’s experience and wisdom to find balanced solutions to the problems of the region.

Participants also exchanged views on the thematic and country-specific areas of cooperation between the two organizations. Multiple delegations called for closer cooperation on the implementation of the women and peace and security and youth, peace and security agendas.³¹ The representatives of Norway and the United States specifically welcomed the cooperation between the League and UN-Women on the development and implementation of national action plans on women and peace and security. The representative of Norway called for strengthening mediation efforts that were sensitive to the issue of children and armed conflict, as well as the prevention of grave violations against children. Several representatives called for increased cooperation in addressing the relationship between climate change and insecurity.³² The representative of Yemen underlined the need to promote cooperation between the Council and the League on early warning, peacekeeping, the peaceful settlement of disputes and post-conflict peacebuilding towards sustaining peace, which could be achieved through the development of mechanisms to exchange information and promote capabilities through training and capacity-building. Council members further called for enhanced joint efforts between the United Nations and the League on settling, among others, the conflicts in Libya, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, as well as the situation in Lebanon.³³

In terms of specific proposals on ways to strengthen cooperation, some delegations emphasized the need for regular communication and exchange of

³¹ United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Norway, Albania, Brazil, United States and Yemen (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

³² Mexico, Ireland, Norway, Ghana, United States and Gabon.

³³ India, Mexico, Albania, China and Gabon.

information between the Council and the League of Arab States.³⁴ The Minister of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates noted the need to institutionalize the relationship which would require establishing mechanisms for the exchange of information and viewpoints on how to address regional challenges from a realistic and practical perspective. Several representatives called for the strengthening of the United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States.³⁵ Council members also stressed the need for coordination between the special envoys of the Secretary-General and the League.³⁶ The representatives of China noted the holding of the first informal dialogue between the Council and the League's Troika in the margins of the General Assembly high-level segment in September 2021 and stated that such dialogue should continue with more flexible and diverse formats. In line with the presidential statements adopted on 13 June 2019 and 29 January 2021,³⁷ the representative of Yemen conveyed the support of the Arab Group for the holding of the annual high-level Council meeting on cooperation with the League, as it served to assist the Council in attaining a deeper and better understanding of Arab crises. He further stressed the need to establish a mechanism that promoted bilateral cooperation and coordination between the Secretary-General and the Arab Group in New York to discuss and address Arab priorities at the United Nations, particularly in the Council, including the holding of periodic formal meetings with the Secretary-General. Several delegations also called for strengthening the trilateral cooperation between the African Union, the League of Arab States and the United Nations to address the multiple cross-regional peace and security issues which affected the Arab region in Africa.³⁸

Case 3

Women and peace and security

³⁴ United Arab Emirates, India, Ghana, Gabon and Yemen (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

³⁵ United Arab Emirates, India, Russian Federation, Mexico, Ireland, Albania, Gabon and Yemen (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

³⁶ India, Russian Federation, Norway, China and Yemen.

³⁷ [S/PRST/2019/5](#) and [S/PRST/2021/2](#).

³⁸ United Arab Emirates, Ghana, Albania, Kenya and Gabon.

On 15 June, at the initiative of Albania which held the presidency of the Council for the month,³⁹ the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Women and peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Keeping the promises: the role of regional organizations in implementing the women and peace and security agenda in the face of political turmoil and seizures of power by force”.⁴⁰ The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of UN-Women, the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the European Union Ambassador for Gender and Diversity, and the Assistant Secretary-General and Head of the Social Affairs Sector at the League of Arab States.⁴¹

Opening the debate, the Secretary-General stated that, when conflict erupted, neighbouring countries and regional organizations could make a significant difference to the women and peace and security agenda by ensuring that commitments were implemented. He noted that the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations on the agenda was reflected not only in joint statements and resolutions, but in the daily work on the ground, including in the Sudan, West and Central Africa and Myanmar. In her briefing, the Executive Director of UN-Women observed that most regional organizations had committed to action plans following the adoption of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), adding that when Member States made such commitments on regional levels, national actions often followed. She added that regional organizations also played a key role in the development of networks of women mediators such as the African Women Leaders Network (FemWise-Africa) which regularly deployed its members to peace processes and national dialogues led by the African Union. Nevertheless, she stressed that, when regional organizations convened negotiations, they had to ensure that women were present in their own right, with their own lived experiences, knowledge and visions for their future. In their remarks, the representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe provided an overview of the contribution of their respective organizations to advancing the women and peace and security agenda and efforts to expand their cooperation with the United Nations

³⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 4 June 2022 ([S/2022/457](#)).

⁴⁰ See [S/PV.9064](#) and [S/PV.9064 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

⁴¹ For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 29, “Women and peace and security”.

and the Council.

Further to the briefings, Council members and other Member States shared their views on the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, particularly with respect to securing the safe participation of women in political processes and decision-making. The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania stated that regional organizations had unique and complementary capacities, which when properly coordinated with the United Nations system, could produce good, fast and effective results in accelerating the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, especially in contexts of political turmoil and the seizure of power by force. The State Secretary of Norway highlighted the importance of regional organizations carrying the weight of many and diverse voices, stating that they were key actors and partners to the United Nations in translating women and peace and security ambitions into actual impact. The representative of Mexico held the view that regional organizations were crucial in promoting political dialogue and advancing respect for human rights, including gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. The representative and Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs of the United Arab Emirates noted that, when properly empowered and supported, regional organizations could expand and complement international practices that may overlook contexts and identities of a conflict. The representative of Brazil recalled that resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#) recognized the complementary role of regional organizations in the implementation of Council resolutions on women and peace and security and that, in recent years, the Council had strengthened dialogue with regional organizations by holding annual meetings and adopting outcome documents. Also noting their complementary role, the representative of Türkiye stated that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations on women and peace and security should be seen in the context of their broader cooperation on conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace and security.

Several speakers highlighted the important positive effect regional organizations had on individual Member States for advancing the women and peace and security agenda.⁴² The representative of Namibia stated that regional actions

⁴² United States, Ireland, Malta, Greece and Namibia.

plans had a catalytic effect by encouraging the development of national action plans and that regional organizations had a convening role that had to be positively exploited. Multiple speakers further pointed out that the successful implementation of the women and peace and security agenda also required strengthening ties between regional actors themselves, including by sharing best practices.⁴³

Council members and other Member States also widely agreed about the importance for the United Nations and regional organizations to support the work of civil society organizations which promoted the political participation of women. The representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that deepening partnerships between regional organizations and local women leaders could promote their roles in conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Similarly, speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security, the representative of Canada stated that in conflicts and crises, including in contexts of seizures of power by force, regional organizations and networks provided much support in conflict prevention, mediation and resolution. The representative of Germany, speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network, stated that to ensure strong implementation, the women and peace and security agenda required strong partnerships between the Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and regional and subregional organizations in order to support women's organizations and peacebuilding initiatives. The representative of Kenya opined that partnerships with regional and subregional organizations implied meaningful partnerships with women's regional networks, which played a key role in contextualizing solutions, broadening action points and identifying informed and practical implementation opportunities for the women and peace and security agenda based on proximity. The representative of Gabon stated that it was important for those valuable initiatives, which included networks of women peacebuilding leaders, to receive financial, logistical and technical support that was stable and predictable.

⁴³ Albania, Ghana, United Kingdom, France, Mexico and Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security), Greece, Namibia and Indonesia.

Case 4

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 11 October, at the initiative of Gabon which held the presidency of the Council for the month,⁴⁴ the Council held a briefing under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” further to the annual report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union.⁴⁵ The Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.⁴⁶

In the subsequent discussion, members and participating non-members of the Council welcomed the deepening relations between the United Nations and the African Union since the signing of the Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in 2017 and their cooperation on the implementation of the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2063 Agenda of the African Union. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Gabon stated that cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union was a standing item on the Council’s agenda because it was key to the effectiveness of international peace and security and because the international community had to ensure that the necessary complementarity and subsidiarity that flowed from their partnership was enhanced. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Gabon and the representative of India further stressed that the partnership between the two organizations was crucial given the prominence of African issues on the agenda of the Council.

More specifically, regarding the division of labour between the United Nations and the African Union, the representative of South Africa underlined the importance for their partnership to be anchored on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. Similarly, the representative of India underlined that the activities of the United Nations, African Union and subregional bodies should

⁴⁴ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 3 October 2022 ([S/2022/736](#)).

⁴⁵ See [S/PV.9149](#). See also [S/2022/643](#).

⁴⁶ For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 36, “Cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.

complement each other, while keeping their respective core mandates intact. The representative of Egypt stated that integration between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council required joint work and exploiting each other's comparative advantages to address conflicts, especially emerging ones. He added that establishing a hierarchy in that context did not mean that the United Nations would relinquish its responsibility as an overarching organization under the Charter.

The representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs of the United Arab Emirates was of the view that the Council should endorse the leadership of African regional and subregional organizations and particularly their efforts to resolve African conflicts. The representative of Norway stated that combining the situational awareness of the African Union with the mandates, tools and technical capacity of the United Nations improved conflict resolution and mediation. Furthermore, participants highlighted a range of areas of cooperation between the United Nations and African Union such as conflict prevention, early warning, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, disarmament, counter-terrorism, countering maritime piracy and security sector reform, among others. Some speakers called for the further enhancement of cooperation in addressing climate and security issues and natural disasters, countering misinformation, food security, mercenaryism, proliferation of arms and the plundering of natural resources.

Multiple speakers focused on the need for stronger cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union on addressing the root causes of conflict and peacebuilding. The representative of Senegal opined that, although considerable progress was made in the implementation of the Joint Framework in terms of mediation and technical electoral assistance, it was still lacking in terms of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. In that regard, he stated that the focus should be on addressing unconstitutional changes of government, the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, security sector reform, national reconciliation, transitional justice and judicial reform. The representatives of Ghana, Ireland and South Africa echoed this view and underscored the importance of cooperation on strengthening good governance, particularly in light of the recent unconstitutional changes of government on the continent. The representative of Egypt

called for the development of a specific United Nations programme to build the capacity of the African Union Commission and subregional organizations to implement the Silencing the Guns initiative and Agenda 2063, in line with the integration benchmarks between the United Nations and the African Union, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter. Similarly, the representative of China called for more tangible assistance for Africa's capacity-building in governance, law enforcement, sustainable development and talent training and development.

With respect to the modalities of cooperation between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, speakers called for the increased use of joint missions, briefings, assessments, reports and political declarations. Several of them highlighted the importance of the annual joint consultative meeting for enhancing coordination.⁴⁷ The representative of Senegal stated that the two Councils had to intensify their dialogue in order to ensure a common understanding of the security dynamics and challenges in Africa and to define the best modalities for supporting African peace and security initiatives.

Most speakers agreed about the need for the international community to ensure predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African peace support operations authorized by the Council, with some of them asserting that such support should be provided from United Nations assessed contributions.⁴⁸ The representative of the United States, also speaking in her capacity as a Member of the President's Cabinet, stated that the implementation of compliance frameworks for African peace support operations on international humanitarian law, human rights and conduct and discipline, including sexual exploitation and abuse, remained a key consideration for United Nations assessed contributions and covered any actions undertaken by regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Moreover, the representatives of Norway and Senegal expressed support for the call of the Secretary-General for a United Nations support office for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. The representative of the Russian Federation recalled that the activities of regional bodies had to be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and that peaceful means had to be given priority in the settlement of disputes. The representative added that, as far as funding methods were concerned, regardless of

⁴⁷ Gabon, Albania, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and Japan.

⁴⁸ France, Kenya, China, India, Egypt, Norway, South Africa and Morocco.

which of them was appropriate, it was important that initiating countries be able to retain the space to make their own policy decisions to counter threats, rather than having them imposed by others.

Many speakers held the view that the reform of the Council to better reflect geopolitical realities and ensure that it was a more representative body was an important element for the strengthening of relations between the United Nations and the African Union.⁴⁹ The representative of South Africa added that a partnership with a global institution without democratic composition and representation undermined the essence of such a partnership. For the representative of Kenya, pending the reform of the Council, the ability of African Member States to act as penholders on Council decisions would bring extra life to Chapter VIII and greater linkage to the African Union.

Case 5

Threats to international peace and security

On 10 November, at the initiative of Ghana which held the presidency of the Council for the month,⁵⁰ the Council held a high-level briefing under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Counter-terrorism in Africa: an imperative for peace, security and development”.⁵¹ The Council was briefed by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Managing Director for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response of the European External Action Service, and the President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group.⁵²

In her statement, while underlining that regional organizations had a critical role to play in fighting terrorism, the Deputy Secretary-General cited several such initiatives in Africa, including the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Accra Initiative and the Nouakchott Process. She welcomed the United Nations-African Union technical

⁴⁹ Gabon, United States, France, Kenya, India, Ghana, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Egypt, Japan, South Africa, Senegal, Namibia, Germany and Morocco.

⁵⁰ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 November 2022 ([S/2022/822](#)).

⁵¹ See [S/PV.9188](#).

⁵² For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 34, “Threats to international peace and security”.

working group on preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism, which aimed to increase coordination and synergies between the two organizations and reiterated the appeal to the Council to ensure predictable funding for African Union peace operations. She further conveyed the need to put in place an innovative architecture that supported African peace operations in an effective and sustainable manner.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission also noted that Africa was not lacking in initiatives to counter terrorism and further mentioned the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) force in Mozambique and the more recently-established East African Community regional force in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. While noting that the African Union had set up a peace fund to work on prevention and to support the efforts of countries that were victims of terrorist violence, he pointed to a pressing need for sustainable financial resources and technical and logistical support to sustain its efforts. The Commissioner was of the view that traditional mechanisms for responding to threats to peace, peacebuilding and peacekeeping were no longer entirely consistent with new circumstances and threats. In that regard, he stated that the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations needed to be urgently revised to make them real actors in the fight against terrorist groups. He further stated that the African Union was ready to work with the United Nations, including the Secretariat and the Council, to bring about an innovative approach at the doctrinal and operational levels.

Expressing a similar view, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group noted that the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council had been debating how to provide African Union missions with reliable funds for years. She observed that many studies concluded that the only credible option in that regard was a mechanism that enabled the Security Council to direct United Nations assessed contributions to African-led stabilization missions. Moreover, she added that the United Nations and African Union would also have to define the rules that would govern the political oversight of future United Nations-funded, African-led operations, as well as the mechanisms for assessing their operational performance and accounting procedures to oversee their finances.

In the discussion that followed, multiple speakers stressed that the African Union and subregional organizations were central to countering violent extremism

and terrorism in Africa. The representative of Brazil commended these efforts within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. Council members agreed that African-led peace operations should not carry the counter-terrorism burden alone. The President of Ghana, together with the representatives of China and Kenya, underscored that it was the responsibility of the Council to support Africa and its regional organizations in that regard. Most speakers expressed support for the establishment of a mechanism to provide African-led peace operations with predictable, sustainable and flexible funding, particularly through United Nations assessed contributions. The representative of France called for using either mandatory United Nations contributions or establishing an innovative mechanism that would combine United Nations with bilateral contributions. He also encouraged the members of the African Union Peace and Security Council and the African Union Commission to redouble their efforts to arrive at a common position on financing African Union-mandated operations. The representative of Norway reiterated her delegation's support for the establishment of a United Nations support office for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. At the same time, she underscored that it was necessary for United Nations funding to be matched by sufficient human rights due diligence and African Union compliance frameworks.

Several speakers underscored that United Nations peacekeeping operations were not the appropriate tool to address terrorism in Africa. Specifically, the representative of Kenya stated that United Nations peacekeeping was not innovating enough to address terrorist groups and called on the Council to learn from the situations in Somalia and Mozambique, particularly citing the operations of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the forces of the SADC. The representative of the Russian Federation argued against imposing additional counter-terrorism obligations on United Nations missions in Africa, stating that this would not be in line with the nature of the Organization's presence and divert valuable resources from other forms of assistance. The representative of India opined that regional and subregional organizations enjoyed advantages in combatting terrorism with regard to language and situational awareness and could respond more quickly and effectively based on a better understanding of the complexities involved. The representative of Norway stated that, working side by side with counter-terrorism

operations, United Nations missions could contribute to the protection of civilians, use of good offices, capacity-building for governance, service delivery and human rights protection. The representative of China noted that African countries had certain expectations regarding the support of United Nations peacekeeping operations for counter-terrorism and called on the Secretariat to take those concerns into consideration and present solutions that conformed to peacekeeping mandates and met the needs of African countries.

More broadly, in his statement, the President of Ghana welcomed the launching of the joint strategic assessment of security and development in the Sahel, encouraged the high-level panel led by former President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger to leverage the best elements of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Accra Initiative, the Nouakchott Process and the Multinational Joint Task Force, consider recommendations for a unified and restructured regional force, and urged the Council to be supportive of such efforts. The representative of Ireland expressed the view that overly militarized counter-terrorism efforts could be ineffective or even counter-productive in the long-term and stressed the need for the Council to work with the African Union, African subregional organizations and African Member States on addressing the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism in a more holistic manner, as part of a One United Nations approach.

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Section II deals with recognition by the Council of the efforts by regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, and subsection B covers discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 52 of the Charter in any of its decisions. The Council, however, acknowledged and expressed support for the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, resolution and sustaining peace, as well as the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and transitions, reconciliation processes and addressing the root causes of conflict. The Council did so in relation to a variety of items on its agenda, as featured in more detail in table 1. The decisions are organized in alphabetical order by item.

Table 1
Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements, 2022

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2022/6 31 August 2022	Second, sixth and twenty-first paragraphs	African Union
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2648 (2022) 29 July 2022	Third preambular paragraph	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
	Resolution 2659 (2022) 14 November 2022	Sixth and twelfth preambular paragraphs, para. 5	African Union, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2666 (2022) 20 December 2022	paras. 10, 15 and 16	African Union, East African Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Southern African Development Community (SADC)
The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2645 (2022) 15 July 2022	Sixteenth and seventeenth preambular paragraphs	Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
The situation in Libya	Resolution 2647 (2022) 28 July 2022	para. 4	African Union, European Union, League of Arab States
	Resolution 2656 (2022) 28 October 2022	para. 6	African Union, European Union, League of Arab States
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2640 (2022) 29 June 2022	Sixth and eleventh preambular paragraphs, para. 14	African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
	Resolution 2649 (2022) 30 August 2022	Fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2624 (2022) 28 February 2022	para. 2	Gulf Cooperation Council
The situation in Myanmar	Resolution 2669 (2022) 21 December 2022	Tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth preambular paragraphs, paras. 5-8	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2625 (2022) 15 March 2022	Sixth preambular paragraph, paras. 21, 22	African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
	Resolution 2630 (2022) 12 May 2022	Fifth preambular paragraph	African Union
	Resolution 2633 (2022) 26 May 2022	Third preambular paragraph	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

During the period under review, Council members discussed the role of multiple regional and subregional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes. For example, in relation to the Central Africa region, Council members highlighted the support provided by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to Member States for advancing inclusive political processes and electoral reforms, addressing cross-cutting issues such as climate-related security risks, implementing the youth, peace and security agenda, and promoting the political participation of women.⁵³ Specifically in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, Council discussions referred to the good offices and mediation efforts of the African Union, ECCAS and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to support the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the 2021 joint roadmap, as well as the engagement of the African Union and ECCAS on the ongoing transition process in Chad.⁵⁴

Regarding the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, Council members exchanged views on the work of the ICGLR in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.⁵⁵ Further to the escalation of violence in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the

⁵³ For more information, see part I, sect. 6, “Central African region”.

⁵⁴ For more information, see part I, sect. 5, “The situation in the Central African Republic”.

⁵⁵ For more information, see part I, sects. 3 and 4, “Great Lakes region” and “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”.

Congo, they also discussed the regional mediation efforts, including the engagement of the East African Community, to achieve a cessation of hostilities and disarmament of armed groups through the Nairobi and Luanda Processes. Regarding Mali and the West Africa and Sahel region, Council discussions focused on the engagement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with transitional authorities in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali to ensure the holding of elections and a return to constitutional order.⁵⁶

In relation to the Sudan, Council members discussed the work of the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and United Nations trilateral mechanism in support of the Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political dialogue to restore the political transition, which resulted in the signing of a political framework agreement on 5 December 2022.⁵⁷ They also continued to express support for the work of the African Union, IGAD and the revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission on the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the 4 August 2022 roadmap for the completion of the political transition. Council members further highlighted the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.⁵⁸

In addition, discussions held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” focused on the cooperation of the United Nations with the African Union and the regional economic communities in capacity-building for sustaining peace in Africa (see case 6).

Case 6

Peace and security in Africa

On 8 August, at the initiative of China which held the presidency of the Council for the month,⁵⁹ the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and sub-item entitled “Capacity-building for sustaining

⁵⁶ For more information, see part I, sects. 8 and 11, “Peace consolidation in West Africa” and “The situation in Mali”.

⁵⁷ For more information, see part I, sect. 7, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.

⁵⁸ For more information, see part I, sect. 18, “Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)”.

⁵⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 August 2022 ([S/2022/592](#)).

peace”.⁶⁰ The Council was briefed by the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Africa and the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.⁶¹

In his briefing, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security stated that, against a very concerning continental and global security context, it was necessary to redouble efforts to develop capacities to sustain peace in Africa. He called for strengthening the linkages between the African Governance Architecture and the African Peace and Security Architecture to provide a springboard for engagement in improving the effectiveness of governance, peace and security. In addition, he noted that the African Union’s Silencing the Guns initiative and Agenda 2063 set out the areas where attention had to be focused on and that the nexus between those two frameworks was critical. The Commissioner concluded his remarks by offering three recommendations. First, he emphasized the need for demonstrable joint transformative leadership between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council which, for Africa, would require building an integrated capacity for peace enforcement operations, based on both a military and a whole-of-society approach. Second, he informed Council members that the African Union was ready to recommit to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 16 on building peace, justice and strong institutions, which he noted was of the utmost importance in the quest for inclusive, effective and accountable institutions in the peace sector. Lastly, the Commissioner underscored the importance of building capacity for political transitions that was inclusive and fully participatory.

In his statement, the President of the Peacebuilding Commission stressed the importance of the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations in Africa in addressing peacebuilding challenges and fostering regional strategies in support of regional capacities to sustain peace. He further noted the Peacebuilding Commission’s commitment to work more closely with the African Union and its Peace and Security Council in support of those strategies and in mobilizing peacebuilding tools to sustain peace.

⁶⁰ See [S/PV.9106](#) and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

⁶¹ For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 9, “Peace and security in Africa”.

In the ensuing discussion, Council members and other participants exchanged views on the key capacities necessary for sustaining peace in Africa. In that regard, they addressed how cooperation could be enhanced between the United Nations, including the Security Council, the African Union and subregional organizations in Africa on conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and the promotion of good governance.

Participants widely recognized the efforts made by the African Union and subregional organizations in developing capacities for sustaining peace, including through Agenda 2063, the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Peace Fund and the African Governance Architecture. Speakers underscored the critical importance of partnership with regional organizations in sustaining peace and the need for an alignment of their respective strategic objectives, particularly with the African Union.⁶² Several delegations also noted that the United Nations-African Union Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security of 2017 was the appropriate strategic framework for building capacity to address peace and security challenges and promote peacebuilding in Africa.⁶³

A number of speakers reflected on the practical aspects of cooperation. The representative of Senegal maintained that the Security Council and the African Union of Peace and Security Council had to intensify their dialogue in order to ensure a common understanding of security dynamics and challenges in Africa and to define the best modalities for supporting African initiatives in that area. In addition to the Joint Framework, the representative of Ghana stated that the annual joint consultative meetings between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council should be enhanced through a more regular exchange of information, joint briefings by special representatives and envoys and joint field visits by senior officials. The representative of Malta stated that the relationship between the Security Council and the African Union, particularly through the African Peace and Security Architecture, enabled the Council to facilitate peace agreements and strengthen regional cooperation on the ground. The representative of Equatorial Guinea was of the view that strengthened cooperation and coordination between the two councils would help to promote peace infrastructure and risk management, and enable the

⁶² Gabon, Norway, Algeria and Italy.

⁶³ Ghana, Senegal, Switzerland, Algeria, Mozambique, Thailand and Argentina.

exploration of further solutions for the allocation of resources and capacity-building for African countries. The representative of South Africa opined that cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations could be further streamlined and strengthened with the harmonization of activities between the African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the African Union liaison offices and the United Nations missions in Africa.

Speakers paid particular attention to the role of the African Union and subregional organizations in promoting good governance and preventing conflict in Africa. Specifically, the representative of Ireland noted their role in responding to coups d'état and particularly commended the preventive diplomacy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its efforts to promote dialogue, democracy, good governance and regional stability. The representative of Germany called for strengthening the vital role of the African Union in preventive diplomacy and fostering democratic resilience and encouraged Member States to follow its call for increased support to African-owned regional conflict prevention, mediation peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The representative of Denmark stated that regional and subregional organizations were instrumental in developing context-specific and tailor-made approaches, often the first to react in crisis response and to engage with the parties concerned to ensure the protection of civilians, and uniquely placed to build trust and promote dialogue among the parties concerned and offer support in mediation and reconciliation. He further recognized that conflict prevention and enduring peace could not be sustained without addressing the root causes of insecurity and conflict and, in that regard, called for a comprehensive whole-of-system response by the United Nations, in cooperation with regional actors, to preventatively address factors that caused and exacerbated conflict.

Participants also discussed the responsibility of the Council to provide sufficient support for increasing capacity for sustaining peace in Africa, particularly through the creation of predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African peace support operations authorized by the Council, including through assessed contributions. The representative of Ethiopia stated that, given that the African Peace and Security Architecture was established in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and that African peace operations were endorsed by the Council, it

was legitimate and practical for the United Nations to allocate the necessary resources for them. The representative of Ireland stated that United Nations peacekeeping operations, in addition to European Union missions and operations, played a key role in strengthening the national security defence capacities of African partners and called on the Council to ensure that human rights due diligence policies were implemented. The representatives of Norway and Senegal expressed support for the establishment of a United Nations support office for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. The representative of Ghana stressed the need for the Council to determine the conditions under which African regional forces acting under Chapter VII of the Charter could meet the requirements for financing, especially from assessed contributions. The representative of the Russian Federation asserted that discussions on financing had been going on in the United Nations for many years and that, as a pretext for opposing such support, special demands were being put forward on African efforts related to human rights. The representative added that agreeing on a common African position on the modalities for financing operations and the use of the African Union Peace Fund was key. The representative of Senegal stated that the revitalization of the Peace Fund, as a mechanism for the operationalization of the African Standby Force, was essential to provide Africa with a collective, autonomous and fully operational security system.

On 31 August 2022, in connection with the same item, the Council adopted a presidential statement in which it welcomed the progress made by African countries, the African Union and subregional organizations in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development.⁶⁴ The Council called for intensified efforts, support and a more coordinated approach to improve capacity-building in addressing these challenges.⁶⁵ The Council encouraged the continued development and application of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes through regional and subregional arrangements and commended the efforts of the African Union to strengthen its capacity, including through the advancement of the African Peace and Security Architecture.⁶⁶ The Council recognized that a major constraint facing the African Union in effectively carrying out African Union-led operations was the need to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources for its operations

⁶⁴ [S/PRST/2022/6](#), second paragraph.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, nineteenth paragraph.

that were authorized by the Council and, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, encouraged further dialogue on options including using United Nations assessed contributions in accordance with resolution [2378 \(2017\)](#).⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Ibid., twentieth paragraph.

III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Note

Section III describes the practice of the Security Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and is organized into three separate subheadings covering peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and authorized by the Council, other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and other regional missions and security forces.

(i) Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements authorized by the Security Council

In 2022, the Council renewed the authorization of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea)⁶⁸ and endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and authorized its mandate as detailed below.⁶⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo Force, established by resolution [1244](#)

⁶⁸ Resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. In addition to the authorization of EUFOR-Althea, the Council renewed its authorization provided by paragraph 11 of resolution [2183 \(2014\)](#) to maintain a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of a NATO Headquarters (see resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), para. 2).

⁶⁹ Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) paras. 22-24, 26 and 27.

(1999), continued to operate and no decisions were taken with respect to its mandate.⁷⁰

African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

In 2022, the Council adopted resolutions [2628 \(2022\)](#) of 31 March, [2657 \(2022\)](#) of 31 October, [2662 \(2022\)](#) of 17 November and [2670 \(2022\)](#) of 21 December 2022 addressing the mandate and reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS.

In resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure AMISOM into ATMIS, and authorized, for an initial period of 12 months, the member States of the African Union to take all necessary measures to: (i) carry out its mandate to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab; (ii) support the capacity-building of the integrated Somali security and police forces; (iii) conduct a phased handover of security responsibilities to Somalia; and (iv) support peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia, in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and National Security Architecture, in support of the development of a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia.⁷¹

The Council authorized the Member States of the African Union to deploy up to 19,626 uniformed ATMIS personnel, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel, including five formed police units, until 31 December 2022, and endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to draw down 2,000 personnel by this date.⁷² The Council further authorized the Member States of the African Union, between 1 January and 31 March 2023, to deploy up to 17,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel and five formed police units.⁷³ The Council noted that the joint proposal and concept of operations submitted by the Secretary-General, together with the African Union, envisaged further reductions to 14,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of a minimum number of 1,040 police, by the end of phase 2 (September 2023), 10,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of a minimum number of 1,040 police personnel by the end of

⁷⁰ For more information on the international security presence in Kosovo, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1996-1999*, chapter VIII, sect. F.

⁷¹ Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), para. 22.

⁷² *Ibid.*, para. 26.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, para. 27.

phase 3 (June 2024), and zero personnel, by the end of phase 4 (December 2024), and expressed its intention to authorize these reductions, taking into account the situation in Somalia and the regular joint technical assessments as outlined in the resolution.⁷⁴

Further to the joint proposal, the Council decided that ATMIS would pursue the following strategic objectives: (a) to conduct jointly-planned operations with Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to the Islamic State in the Levant/Da'esh; (b) to support Somali security forces by jointly holding priority population centres and providing protection to local communities and United Nations personnel and installations, while coordinating to support the implementation of the Somalia National Stabilisation Strategy and State Stabilisation Plans; (c) to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in the implementation of stabilisation efforts for all recovered areas; (d) to support the capacity development of the Somali security forces to facilitate the progressive takeover of security responsibilities; (e) to support the Somali security forces across the clear, hold and build phases, in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and, in collaboration with Federal Government institutions, by facilitating humanitarian liaison, community engagement, as well as assisting Somali security forces with complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and holding accountable those responsible for violations thereof.⁷⁵

The Council underlined the need for Somalia and its partners to take a coordinated approach towards supporting Somali-led political and security reforms to enable a progressive transition of security responsibility to Somalia and requested the United Nations to establish a technical partnership coordination function to increase coordination and collaboration between the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, ATMIS, the United Nations Support Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations country team and other partners.⁷⁶ In addition, the Council requested the United Nations, jointly with the African Union, the Federal Government of Somalia, the European Union and other donors to identify relevant, clear and realistic benchmarks in order to assess the implementation of the security transition by 30 September 2022, taking into account resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), while also requesting these actors to undertake regular, joint technical assessments of progress made to guide the Council as it further

⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 28.

⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 23 (a)-(e).

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 48.

decided on the next steps of the phased drawdown of ATMIS and support provided by UNSOS, reporting to the Council by 15 February 2023.⁷⁷ Furthermore, underlining the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and under the Council's authority consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General, the African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for ATMIS, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and other partners, and considering the limitations of voluntary funding, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for ATMIS.⁷⁸

Finally, the Council underlined the importance of ATMIS forces continuing to cooperate with UNSOM and UNSOS in implementing the human rights due diligence policy, including in the context of joint or coordinated operations with Somali security and police forces, and recognized the role that the African Union compliance framework and its operationalisation in ATMIS could play in enhancing compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.⁷⁹ The Council also encouraged efforts to ensure female uniformed personnel were deployed to ATMIS by troop- and police-contributing countries and urged the Mission to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women across its operations and to integrate a gender perspective throughout the delivery of its mandate.⁸⁰

In resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), the Council recalled its authorisation of ATMIS in resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) and commended the renewed cooperation between all stakeholders to implement its mandate in support of the Somalia Transition Plan and National Security Architecture and to empower Somalia to progressively assume greater responsibility for its own security.⁸¹ By resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated its request to the Somali Government, ATMIS and other partners to share information with the Panel of Experts on Somalia regarding the conduct or activities, in particular by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia.⁸² The Council

⁷⁷ Ibid., paras. 50 and 51.

⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 49.

⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 31.

⁸⁰ Ibid., para. 35.

⁸¹ Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 1

⁸² Resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), paras. 27 and 46.

further reiterated its request for ATMIS to support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports.⁸³

Finally, by resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council exceptionally extended its authorisations under resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) until 30 June 2023, and affirmed that paragraph 27 of that resolution, which provided for the deployment of up to 17,626 uniformed personnel from 1 January to 31 March 2023, was annulled.⁸⁴ The Council recalled the revision of the operational timeline requested by Somalia, which was supported by the African Union Peace and Security Council in its communiqué of 11 November 2022,⁸⁵ to complete the drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel by 30 June 2023.⁸⁶ The Council further noted that the African Union Peace and Security Council reconfirmed the commitment to maintain the exit date for ATMIS of 31 December 2024.⁸⁷ The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide the report initially requested under paragraph 51 of resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) by 15 February 2023, by 30 April 2023 instead, and decided to convene a formal meeting on the transition in Somalia no later than 31 March 2023.⁸⁸

Operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

By resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#) of 2 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed its authorization of EUFOR-Althea for a period of 12 months.⁸⁹ The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stressed that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary.⁹⁰ The Council also authorized Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of either

⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

⁸⁴ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), para. 1 (a).

⁸⁵ See [S/2022/939](#).

⁸⁶ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 1(b).

⁸⁸ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 (c) and 3.

⁸⁹ Resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

⁹⁰ Resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

EUFOR-Althea or NATO Headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. In addition, the Council recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.⁹¹

(ii) Other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

The Council also addressed the role and mandates of other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the European Union training missions in the Central African Republic and Mali, and expressed support for the development and deployment of the African Standby Force and the East African Community force in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

In resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#) of 29 June 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council expressed support for the support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, as per the conditions set out in resolutions [2391 \(2017\)](#) and [2531 \(2020\)](#), and in the technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel, through emergency evacuation of the sick or wounded and casualty evacuation, access to life support consumables, and the use of engineering plant equipment, material and enabling units.⁹² The Council recalled that this support had always been considered as a temporary measure provided in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy.⁹³ The Council further reiterated its call on the Joint Force to continue

⁹¹ Ibid., para. 4. For further information on the authorization of the use of force in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.

⁹² Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 34. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

⁹³ Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 34.

developing its own capacity to support itself, while taking note that the European Union decided to suspend temporarily and reversibly some of its funding.⁹⁴

Going forward, the Council requested for the next report by the Secretary-General on the Joint Force to contain updates on the independent high-level panel strategic assessment on security and development in the Sahel, as well as a section assessing how Mali's decision to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel impacted the support being provided by MINUSMA.⁹⁵ The Council also expressed its intent to make a decision on the continuation of such support, while noting the views and decisions of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the European Union.⁹⁶ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure close coordination and information sharing, where appropriate, between MINUSMA, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and subregional organizations, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Group of Five for the Sahel, as well as to ensure adequate coordination, exchange of information and, when applicable, support within their respective mandates and through existing mechanisms, between MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French Forces, until the planned end of their presence in Mali, and the European Union missions in Mali.⁹⁷

European Union Training Missions in the Central African Republic and Mali

By resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#) of 14 November 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council maintained the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to provide strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic to implement the National Strategy on Security Sector Reform and the National Defence Plan, in close coordination with, inter alia, the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA), the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM-RCA), the African Union

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., para. 35.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., paras. 24, 28 and 36.

Observer Mission in the Central African Republic and other international partners.⁹⁸ The Council also decided that the mandate of MINUSCA included taking a leading role in supporting the Central African Republic authorities in enhancing the capacities of the Internal Security Forces, particularly its command and control structures and oversight mechanisms, and to coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the Central African Republic, in particular with EUTM-RCA and EUAM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of security sector reform.⁹⁹

In resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council encouraged the European Union, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its European Union Training Mission in Mali and European Union Capacity-building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel, to continue its efforts to support Malian authorities in security sector reform and the re-establishment of State authority and presence throughout the Malian territory.¹⁰⁰ The Council further encouraged close coordination of these efforts with MINUSMA and requested the Secretary-General to enhance cooperation between MINUSMA and the European Union Training Mission in Mali and European Union capacity-building mission in Mali, including by developing further complementarity between the missions and by exploring modalities for potential mutual support.¹⁰¹

African Standby Force and the East African Community regional force

In a presidential statement adopted on 31 August 2022, the Council emphasized that the presence of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism could exacerbate conflicts, and contribute to undermining affected States, specifically their security, stability, governance, social and economic development.¹⁰² The Council stressed the need for strengthened support to African countries, including through capacity support and institutional training, to address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to

⁹⁸ Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 36 (d)(i). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

⁹⁹ Resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#), para. 36 (d)(iii).

¹⁰⁰ Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 38.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² [S/PRST/2022/6](#), sixteenth paragraph.

terrorism on national, sub-regional and regional levels, including through supporting the full operation of the African Standby Force, the delivery of effective and targeted capacity-building, sharing of information and best practices, and mobilizing more sustainable and predicable resources and expertise.¹⁰³

In connection with the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council encouraged support to the East African Community regional force and stressed the importance of the protection of civilians, close coordination and information sharing between the regional force, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), the Burundi National Defence Forces, Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces and MONUSCO, including to deconflict operations and to ensure MONUSCO mandate implementation and the need to carry out all operations in strict compliance with international law and the African Union compliance framework.¹⁰⁴

B. Discussion concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements such as EUFOR-Althea,¹⁰⁵ ATMIS,¹⁰⁶ the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Collective Security and Treaty Organization (CSTO),¹⁰⁷ the East African Community regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,¹⁰⁸ the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel,¹⁰⁹ and the NATO-led Kosovo Force.¹¹⁰ Discussions of relevance for the interpretation of Chapter VIII of the Charter in the context of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping were held under the following items: "Peace and security in Africa" specifically focused on the counter-terrorism efforts of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (see case 7); and "The situation in Somalia" in relation to the reconfiguration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), para. 17.

¹⁰⁵ See [S/PV.9029](#), [S/PV.9065](#) and [S/PV.9179](#).

¹⁰⁶ See [S/PV.8965](#), [S/PV.9009](#), [S/PV.9040](#), [S/PV.9125](#), [S/PV.9188](#) and [S/PV.9232](#).

¹⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8967](#).

¹⁰⁸ See [S/PV.9081](#), [S/PV.9142](#) and [S/PV.9165](#).

¹⁰⁹ See [S/PV.8944](#), [S/PV.8945](#), [S/PV.9035](#), [S/PV.9061](#), [S/PV.9188](#) and [S/PV.9194](#).

¹¹⁰ See [S/PV.9019](#) and [S/PV.9155](#).

Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the transition of its security responsibilities to the Somali national authorities (see case 8).

Case 7

Peace and security in Africa

At a meeting held on 18 May under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council discussed the mandate and operations of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and its cooperation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) further to the report of the Secretary-General.¹¹¹ The Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, and the Coordinator and President of the Rights and Resources Initiative, a civil society organization.

In her remarks, the Assistant Secretary-General stated that, against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, the decision of the Malian transitional authorities to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel and its Joint Force was regrettable. She noted that the current challenging political and security dynamics in the Sahel, including the uncertain outcomes of the transitions in Mali and Burkina Faso, affected the operationalization of the Joint Force, which had slowed down significantly. In light of the growing complexity of the crisis, she noted that the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission would jointly carry out a strategic assessment of security and governance initiatives in the Sahel, with the objective of strengthening support to the Group of Five for the Sahel, its Joint Force and other security and governance initiatives in the region. The Assistant Secretary-General further noted that the assessment, which would be overseen by an independent high-level panel chaired by the former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, would also focus on innovative ways to mobilize sustainable resourcing for those regional initiatives.

In his remarks, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel recalled that the Heads of State of the organization’s members had always appealed to

¹¹¹ See [S/PV.9035](#). See also [S/2022/382](#).

the United Nations to support the Joint Force because their countries were fighting against terrorism, not only in their own interests, but also in the interest of international peace and security. He also noted that the three African members of the Council had always advocated for a positive stance towards the Joint Force that would allow it to meet the challenges, as the support provided by MINUSMA remained below the expectations. Nevertheless, the Executive Security added that, since the end of 2019, the Joint Force was able to carry out numerous operations and put in place a compliance framework to ensure respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

In the discussion that followed the briefings, Council members underscored the importance of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel as a regional effort to address the threat of terrorism. The representative of Ghana, who also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya, stated that the continuous support for regionally-led and complementary initiatives, including through bilateral and multilateral support for the Joint Force, remained one of the most effective ways to counter the security challenges in the Sahel. Most delegations expressed concern and disappointment with the decision of Mali to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel. In that regard, most Council members also expressed concern about the impact of the withdrawal, as well as the recent unconstitutional changes of government in Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, on the operations of the Joint Force. Several delegations underscored the need for continued engagement by member States of the Group of Five for the Sahel to ensure the necessary coordination of their efforts in the fight against terrorism.¹¹²

Council members exchanged views on the operational difficulties faced by the Joint Force and the need for support from the United Nations. The representative of China stated that MINUSMA should continue to improve its logistical support and that the United Nations should explore more solutions. The representative of India stressed the importance for traditional peacekeeping to be complemented by regional operations in order to neutralize terrorist groups and entities and called for sustainable and predictable support to the Joint Force. While expressing regret that the Council did not reach an agreement on the creation of a United Nations support office for the Joint Force, the representative of France stated that increased support from the Council and Member States for robust African operations was vital and that without it

¹¹² Albania, China, India, Mexico and Ghana (also speaking on behalf of Gabon and Kenya).

there was a risk of more countries turning to harmful solutions such as the use of mercenaries. The representative of Ghana maintained that the withdrawal of Mali from the Joint Force required the Council and other partners to speak with one voice on the appropriate support mechanisms for other regional-led initiatives to fill security gaps, such as for the Nouakchott Process, the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahel-Saharan region, the Accra Initiative and the mobilization of an ECOWAS standby force, while also finding the much-needed support mechanism to strengthen the Joint Force itself.

Several speakers highlighted the importance of the human rights compliance framework for the Joint Force endorsed by the Group of Five for the Sahel. The representative of Albania expressed concern with reports of sexual and gender-based violence committed by Joint Force personnel, encouraged better monitoring of such cases and urged the force to comply with the framework. The representative of Brazil, as echoed by the representative of Norway, urged the Joint Force to pay particular attention to the elements related to child protection in its compliance framework. The representative of Ireland opined that it was not possible to effectively address terrorism if the fundamental principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law were ignored.

Several Council members welcomed the launching of the high-level assessment of security and development in the Sahel, particularly in the context of changing political and security dynamics in the region.¹¹³ The representative of China expressed the view that the assessment should focus on the challenges faced by countries of the region with regard to logistics, funding and capacity-building and put forward realistic solutions. The representative of Mexico opined that, without a clear, solid political agreement among the countries of the region regarding the strategy to be followed, it would be difficult for the Council to make progress in its discussions on how the United Nations could increase its support for combatting terrorism in the Sahel, including the financing of the Joint Force.

Case 8

The situation in Somalia

¹¹³ Albania, Brazil, China, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and United Arab Emirates.

At a meeting held on 23 May under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”, Council members discussed the reconfiguration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) further to resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#).¹¹⁴ In his statement to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) noted that, since the formal transition from AMISOM to ATMIS on 1 April 2022, Somali and African Union security officials were heavily focused on electoral security. He further noted that the United Nations had taken steps to engage both the Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS on the way forward in the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan and the Mission’s mandate. Moreover, he recalled that the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) continued to provide support under its mandate to ATMIS and established a transition cell to ensure it was well postured to meet the needs of the new Mission.

In his briefing, the Special Representative of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS stated that the establishment of the Mission was followed by transition activities in close collaboration with the Somali Federal Government, primarily focused on joint security forces disruption operations, securing main population centres and supply routes, mentoring and training of Somali security forces and joint planning and coordination. He added that force generation and adequate and predictable funding and equipment were key to degrading Al-Shabaab and ensuring the success of the transition within the 2024 timeline for the handing over of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces, as defined under resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#).

Council members commended the support provided by ATMIS for the Somali electoral process and noted the casualties among its personnel during this time. The representative of China expressed his delegation’s expectation that the United Nations, the Government of Somalia, the African Union and other relevant parties would discuss and define the sharing of responsibilities and the assessment benchmarks during the transition period, in accordance with the requirements of Council resolutions. Multiple delegations underscored that the successful implementation of the ATMIS mandate and the transition of responsibilities to the

¹¹⁴ See [S/PV.9040](#).

Somali security forces under the Somalia Transition Plan depended on the provision of adequate, sustainable and predictable funding for the Mission.¹¹⁵ The representative Gabon, who also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Kenya, and the representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that a careful and effective transition from ATMIS to the Somali security forces was required to prevent the creation of a security vacuum which would enable Al-Shabaab to expand its operations. By contrast, the representative France stated that no new funding, regardless of the amount, would suffice without Somali efforts to generate armed forces or without strong support from ATMIS to help Somali forces and conduct offensive operations with them. He added that France therefore encouraged the Government and ATMIS to resolutely commit to the security transition in order to achieve the objectives as outlined in resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#).

¹¹⁵ China, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Russian Federation and India.

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided for in Article 53 of the Charter. The present section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations, with the exception of authorizations to use force for regional peacekeeping operations, which are covered in section III above. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also covered in the present section. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and subsection B covers discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

In 2022, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. It did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

Concerning the situation in Libya, in resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the authorizations as set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in order to ensure implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.¹¹⁶ By resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

trafficking from Libya, seize those that were confirmed as being used for those purposes, and authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers in carrying out the aforementioned activities.¹¹⁷

Also acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted several decisions not involving the use of force, such as requesting the support of regional and subregional organizations in the implementation of sanctions measures or calling for their cooperation with sanctions committees and panels of experts, particularly those concerning the Central African Republic, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen, as outlined in table 2. The Council further requested the support of regional and subregional organizations for the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Table 2

Decisions by which the Council requested the cooperation of regional arrangements in the implementation of enforcement action, 2022

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2648 (2022) 29 July 2022	para. 10
The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2653 (2022) 21 October 2022	para. 23
The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2624 (2022) 28 February 2022	para. 18
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Resolution 2663 (2022) 30 November 2022	para. 23
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2625 (2022) 15 March 2022	Twentieth preambular paragraph and para. 23
	Resolution 2633 (2022) 26 May 2022	paras. 17, 20

B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements

In 2022, the Council heard two semi-annual briefings under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan” by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#)

¹¹⁷ Resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

by which the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, referred the situation in Darfur to the Court.¹¹⁸ At the meeting held on 17 January,¹¹⁹ the representative of Kenya recalled that, in resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), the Council invited the International Criminal Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements to facilitate the Court's work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region. Further to the statement of the representative of Kenya, the Prosecutor highlighted his engagement with the African Union and underscored that the Darfur case had to be properly investigated and put before an appropriate tribunal, whether it be the International Criminal Court, a tribunal in the Sudan or a hybrid option, including with support from the African Union. Similarly, at the second meeting held on 23 August,¹²⁰ the representative of Ghana noted the steps taken by the Court to increase avenues of accountability through cooperation with third States and international and regional organizations, adding that increased cooperation with the African Union could help address the lack of cooperation between the Court and the Sudanese authorities and garner support for other cases that the Prosecutor was investigating.

In 2022, discussions in the context of meetings of the Council also focused on the activities and mandate of Operation IRINI in Libya under the items entitled, "The situation in Libya" and "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security",¹²¹ and EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia under the item entitled "The situation in Somalia".¹²² In both cases, participants discussed the roles of these operations in support of the arms embargoes imposed by the Council concerning Libya and Somalia, respectively.¹²³

At a meeting held on 3 June under the item entitled "The situation in Libya", acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#)

¹¹⁸ See [S/PV.8948](#) and [S/PV.9113](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 7 and *Repertoire, Supplements 2004-2007 to 2021*.

¹¹⁹ See [S/PV.8948](#).

¹²⁰ See [S/PV.9113](#).

¹²¹ See, in connection with cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, [S/PV.9065](#); and, in connection with the situation in Libya, [S/PV.9047](#), [S/PV.9053](#) and [S/PV.9098](#). For more information on the establishment of Operation Irini in Libya, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part VIII, sect. IV.

¹²² See [S/PV.8965](#). For more information on the establishment of EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008-2009*, chapter VIII, sect. IV.

¹²³ For further details, see part I sects. 2 and 10 as well as part VIII, sect. III concerning the sanctions measures in place with regard to Somalia and Libya and part IX, sect. I.B.1 concerning the sanctions committees established pursuant to resolutions [751 \(1992\)](#) and [1970 \(2011\)](#).

by which it extended the authorizations for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations to inspect vessels in support of the arms embargo off the coast of Libya.¹²⁴ Following the adoption of the resolution, having abstained in the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that Operation IRINI had over recent years demonstrated very low levels of effectiveness in assisting the implementation of the provisions of the Libyan arms embargo.¹²⁵ In that regard, the representative pointed to a lack of successful seizures of contraband goods, lack of transparency and a selective approach to vessels flying flags of particular States. He further stated that, for the upcoming year, the Russian Federation would continue to closely monitor the work of Operation IRINI to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo, particularly whether it was effective in combatting flows of illegal weapons and whether it was in line with the mandate stipulated in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#).

Subsequently, at a meeting held on 25 July under the same item, the representative of Mexico expressed concern with reports of possible shipments of military equipment to Libya in contravention of Council resolutions.¹²⁶ He called on all States to cooperate with Operation IRINI in order to prevent weapons from continuing to fuel violence in the country. He further recalled that the authorization by the Council could be used by any State or regional organization to monitor compliance with the arms embargo. Several representatives stated that the interception of a vessel which was in violation of the arms embargo demonstrated the importance of Operation IRINI for its implementation.¹²⁷

At a meeting held on 15 February under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia” and further to the report of the Secretary-General,¹²⁸ Council members discussed the mandate of Operation Atalanta of the European Union, for which the Council’s authorization was due to expire on 2 March 2022.¹²⁹ At the meeting, Council members heard the briefings of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and

¹²⁴ See [S/PV.9053](#). For: Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *abstentions*: Russian Federation.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹²⁶ See [S/PV.9098](#).

¹²⁷ United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Norway and Albania.

¹²⁸ See [S/2022/101](#).

¹²⁹ See [S/PV.8965](#). For more information on the establishment of Operation Atalanta of the European Union, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part VIII, sect. IV.

Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The representative of the European Union held the view that Operation Atalanta had successfully contributed to the suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia. While noting the readiness of the European Union to work with the Somali authorities to support their efforts on maritime security, the representative expressed hope that the Council would be able to agree on a revised resolution that better reflected Somali priorities, while also renewing the legal provisions necessary for the continuation of Operation Atalanta for at least the remainder of the year. He further cautioned that, if the resolution was not extended beyond 3 March 2022, Operation Atalanta would not have the authorization to fight piracy or to protect the deliveries of the World Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels in the Somali territorial waters.¹³⁰

During the discussion, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that her delegation had no objection in principle to the desire of the Federal Government of Somalia to move to a bilateral maritime cooperation framework,¹³¹ while at the same time expressing support for an extension of resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#) until such a framework was in place to avoid any operational gaps, which included ensuring that Operation Atalanta could continue to function.

Council members and other delegations also discussed the role of regional organizations in support of the implementation of sanctions measures on the Central African Republic and South Sudan. On 26 May, at a meeting held under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) by which it renewed sanctions measures on South Sudan.¹³² In his remarks after the vote, the representative of Kenya noted that his country abstained in the voting because the text fell short of the call by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union for the lifting of the arms embargo and targeted sanctions on South Sudan. Echoing this view, the representative of China noted that the African Union Peace and Security Council took this position on the sanctions measures in

¹³⁰ During the period under review, the authorizations for Operation Atalanta were not renewed upon their expiry on 3 March 2022.

¹³¹ See [S/2022/162](#).

¹³² See [S/PV.9045](#). *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstentions*: China, Gabon, India, Kenya, Russian Federation.

order to allow South Sudan to build the security capacity necessary to maintain national security and stability. He further recommended that the Council adopt measures to gradually ease the sanctions regime which would help South Sudan respond positively to the concerns of the African Union.

At a meeting held on 29 July under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”,¹³³ acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#). As a result, the Council extended the sanctions measures on the Central African Republic.¹³⁴ Speaking after the vote, the representative of Kenya explained that his delegation abstained in the voting because resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#) fell short of the full lifting of the arms embargo, as advocated by the Government of the Central African Republic, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) States and the International Conference on the Great Lakes region. The representative further maintained that, in line with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, the least the Council could do was to give those regional organizations a more respectful hearing. The representative of the Russian Federation echoed this view and stated that the voices of African States had again gone unheard, despite the frequent promises in the Council to take account of the views of regional organizations. While noting that the resolution had replaced the arms embargo with a notification regime, the representative of Gabon also stated that the text did not take into account the recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council which had requested the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the national defence and security forces of the Central African Republic to fully carry out their constitutional mandate to protect their country and citizens. Acknowledging that the resolution partially addressed the assessments and claims of the Central African authorities, the African Union and other regional organizations, the representative of Brazil stated that the voices of these stakeholders could made a meaningful contribution, not only because of their legitimacy, but primarily because they offered a perspective that considered the peace and security situation in the Central African Republic on its own merits. The representative of the Central African Republic recalled the communiqué issued by the African Union Peace and Security Council which reiterated its call to the African members of the Security Council,

¹³³ See [S/PV.9105](#).

¹³⁴ *For:* Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *Against:* none; *Abstaining:* China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation.

namely Gabon, Ghana and Kenya, to show solidarity in accordance with the principles of the African Union Charter, which opposed unjust sanctions against African States.

V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines the reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, subsection B covers discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, and subsection C covers communications concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations on peacekeeping operations led by them, either directly or through the Secretary-General, as well as on maritime enforcement actions undertaken further to relevant resolutions of the Council, as described in further detail and summarized in table 3.

Concerning Libya, in resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report in six and 11 months on the implementation of the authorizations set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) for Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.¹³⁵ In addition, in resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), the Council renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), requiring Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya.¹³⁶ The Council further

¹³⁵ Resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolutions [2578 \(2021\)](#) and [2635 \(2022\)](#) (S/2022/360 and S/2022/910).

¹³⁶ Resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), para. 2. See also report of the Secretary-General dated 30 August 2022 pursuant to resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#) (S/2022/655).

requested the Secretary-General to report 11 months after the adoption of the resolution on its implementation.¹³⁷

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every three months after the adoption of resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), on the coordination, exchange of information and mutual operational and logistical support between the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French forces until the planned end of their presence in Mali, and the European Union missions in Mali.¹³⁸

In relation to Somalia, in resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested the African Union to keep it informed through the Secretary-General on the implementation of the mandate of the newly-established African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and defined specific timelines for the submission of its reports, as well as matters on which specific reporting was required.¹³⁹ In addition, the Council requested the United Nations, jointly with the African Union, Federal Government of Somalia, European Union and other donors, to undertake regular, joint technical assessments made against the benchmarks requested under the resolution to guide the Council on the next steps of the drawdown of ATMIS and support provided by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).¹⁴⁰ In resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested the African Union to provide an update on its preparations for the planned drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel by 31 December 2022 in accordance with resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#).¹⁴¹

In connection with the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, in resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), the Council encouraged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to share reports of fighting and violations of the 2017 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the permanent ceasefire provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.¹⁴² In the same resolution, the Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the

¹³⁷ Resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

¹³⁸ Resolution [2640 \(2022\)](#), para. 57(ii).

¹³⁹ Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), para. 53.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 51.

¹⁴¹ Resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), para. 47(f).

¹⁴² Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

Hybrid Court for South Sudan with the Secretary-General.¹⁴³ Similarly, in resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), the Council invited the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission to share relevant information with the Council on its assessment of the implementation by the parties of the Revitalized Agreement, adherence to the cessation of hostilities and the facilitation of unhindered and secure humanitarian access.¹⁴⁴

Finally, in a presidential statement adopted on 31 August in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council recognized that one major constraint facing the African Union in effectively carrying out peace operations was the need to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources that were authorized by the Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter. In that regard, the Council encouraged further dialogue on options, including using United Nations assessed contributions for addressing the issue and requested the Secretary-General to provide a report on the progress made by the United Nations and the African Union to fulfil the commitments as set out in resolution [2320 \(2016\)](#) and resolution [2378 \(2017\)](#) and recommendations on moving forward that reflected good practices and lessons learned with a view to securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources.¹⁴⁵

In 2022, the Council also continued to receive reports on the activities of EUFOR-Althea, the European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, and the NATO-led Kosovo Force.¹⁴⁶

Table 4
Decisions concerning the reporting of activities by regional arrangements, 2022

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
The situation in Libya	Resolution 2635 (2022) 3 June 2022	para. 2	Secretary-General

¹⁴³ Ibid., para. 24.

¹⁴⁴ Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), para. 23.

¹⁴⁵ [S/PRST/2022/6](#), twentieth paragraph.

¹⁴⁶ Concerning EUFOR-Althea, see resolution [1575 \(2004\)](#) and the corresponding report of the Secretary-General: [S/2022/591](#). Concerning the European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, see resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#) and the corresponding report of the Secretary-General: [S/2022/819](#). Concerning the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, see resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General: [S/2022/382](#) and [S/2022/838](#). Concerning the NATO-led Kosovo force, see resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#) and the corresponding report of the Secretary-General: [S/2022/208](#).

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2022/6 31 August 2022	Twentieth paragraph	Secretary-General
Maintenance of international peace and security	Resolution 2652 (2022) 29 September 2022	para. 3	Secretary-General
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2640 (2022) 29 June 2022	para. 35, 57 (ii)	Secretary-General
The situation in Myanmar	Resolution 2669 (2022) 21 December 2022	para. 6.	Secretary-General, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2628 (2022) 31 March 2022	paras. 51, 53, 54	Secretary-General, African Union, European Union
	Resolution 2662 (2022) 17 November 2022	para. 47(f)	African Union
	Resolution 2670 (2022) 21 December 2022	para. 1 (c), (d)	Secretary-General, African Union, European Union
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2625 (2022) 15 March 2022	Ninth preambular paragraph, para. 24	Secretary-General, African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
	Resolution 2633 (2022) 26 May 2022	para. 23	Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC)

B. Discussion concerning the reporting by regional arrangements, 2022

During the period under review, Article 54 of the Charter was explicitly mentioned in a meeting of the Council held on 16 February under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” during which Council members discussed the cooperation between the United Nations and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).¹⁴⁷ In his briefing to the Council, the Secretary-General of the CSTO noted the deployment of a CSTO peacekeeping force following civil unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022 and stated that, in line with the requirements under Article 54 of the Charter and Article 4 of the Treaty on Collective Security, the CSTO swiftly informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations about the

¹⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8967](#). For more information on the discussion, see sect. I.

operation by letter.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that, following the decision of the CSTO to deploy the force further to the request of Kazakhstan, the Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations were immediately informed of the operation. The representative of Kazakhstan added that the United Nations was properly informed in a timely manner about the intention of the CSTO to deploy the force.

C. Communications concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

In five letters addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of Kuwait¹⁴⁹ and Lebanon,¹⁵⁰ in their respective capacities as Chairs of the Council of the League of Arab States, and citing Article 54 of the Charter, transmitted the decisions of the Council of the League on a variety of peace and security issues affecting the Arab region. Furthermore, in a letter dated 17 March 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the United Arab Emirates circulated a concept note for a Council briefing held on 23 March 2022 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Cooperation between the Security Council and the League of Arab States”, noting that Article 54 required regional organizations to keep the Council informed of their activities pertaining to international peace and security.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8967](#).

¹⁴⁹ [S/2022/57](#), [S/2022/169](#) and [S/2022/394](#).

¹⁵⁰ [S/2022/349](#) and [S/2022/372](#).

¹⁵¹ [S/2022/240](#). For more information on the discussion at that meeting, see sect. I.