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Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2023. These field-based subsidiary organs are divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which also covers the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peacekeeping operations and special political missions covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor missions are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each mission (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the missions are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect

the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council. The introduction to section I includes an overview table of changes to the composition of peacekeeping operations during the reporting period (table 3).

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each mission, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I is focused on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2023

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 12 peacekeeping operations.¹ Six of the operations were in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one in Asia. The Council terminated the mandate of one operation and did not establish any new missions in 2023.

Extensions and terminations of mandates

By resolution [2690 \(2023\)](#) of 30 June, the Council terminated the existing mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), with a view to the cessation of the Mission's operations, transfer of its tasks and the withdrawal of its personnel by 31 December 2023.

In 2023, the Council also extended the mandates of the following eight peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

¹ For Council discussions under the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations", see part I, sect. 24. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations: differences in scope

In 2023, the mandates of peacekeeping operations continued to vary considerably. The Council reauthorized MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement a broad array of mandated tasks.² The mandates of the three missions continued to include tasks related to the protection of civilians, the protection and promotion of human rights, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment. The Council also retained the implementation of peace agreements and political transitions as priorities for MINUSCA and UNMISS. MINUSCA and MONUSCO also remained focused on support for stabilization and the extension of State authority. The previously relatively broad mandate of MINUSMA was, during the course of its drawdown and withdrawal, and as described in further detail below, limited to the protection of civilians and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The mandates of the remaining eight peacekeeping operations remained relatively narrower by comparison. UNIFIL and UNISFA, as interim security forces, remained focused on observing the redeployment of forces and maintaining security within their areas of responsibility. Both missions were reauthorized to use force in fulfilling only specific tasks such as the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment, the protection of their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, and the protection of the Mission's area of responsibility.³ UNFICYP continued to support the maintenance of the ceasefire and

² In connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 35; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), paras. 32 and 34 (i)(b); and, in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), paras. 3 and 3 (a)(i).

³ In connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), para. 22; and, in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2708 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

bicommunal contacts in Cyprus, while longstanding observer missions such as MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMOGIP and UNTSO concentrated on the monitoring of ceasefires and the implementation of armistice and disengagement agreements.⁴

Mandates of peacekeeping operations: modifications

During the period under review, the Council modified the mandates of five of the 12 existing peacekeeping operations, namely, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNIFIL and UNMISS, with particular emphasis placed on the protection of civilians, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political transitions, the extension of State authority, human rights, strategic communications and cross-cutting issues.

Specifically, the Council strengthened the mandate of UNMISS by requesting the Mission to use all necessary means to ensure effective, timely and dynamic protection of civilians through a comprehensive and integrated approach.⁵ The Council further introduced several new elements to the Mission's protection tasks, including maintaining a mobile, flexible and effective posture by conducting patrols in high risk areas, internally displaced persons camps and the Mission's protection of civilians site and tracking, analyzing and reporting on the rate and effectiveness of its responses in this context, including by ensuring that risks of sexual and gender-based violence were included in its data collection, threat analysis and early warning system.⁶ As part of the Mission's protection of civilians activities, the Council also newly tasked UNMISS to monitor and report on the environmental impacts of its operations.⁷

The Council placed special emphasis on the protection of civilians and United Nations and humanitarian personnel in the context of the withdrawal of MINUSMA from Mali and of MONUSCO from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this regard, having terminated the mandate of MINUSMA and initiated its complete withdrawal, the Council authorized the Mission to respond to imminent threats of violence to civilians and contribute to

⁴ In connection with MINURSO, resolution [2703 \(2023\)](#), para 1; in connection with UNDOF, resolutions [2689 \(2023\)](#) and [2718 \(2023\)](#), para. 15; and, in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2674 \(2023\)](#), para. 10.; and, in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2674 \(2023\)](#), para. 10. See also, in connection with UNMOGIP, resolutions [47 \(1948\)](#) and [91 \(1951\)](#); and, in connection with UNTSO, resolution [48 \(1948\)](#).

⁵ Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), para. 3 (a)(i).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., para. 3 (a)(vii).

the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁸ Moreover, while taking note of the comprehensive disengagement plan submitted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations, the Council requested MONUSCO to develop integrated provincial protection plans to ensure the Mission's responsible withdrawal and to support the creation of a protective environment, including strengthening mechanisms for the unarmed protection of civilians.⁹ Moreover, the Council emphasized the importance of effective strategic communications in the withdrawal of both Missions to enhance their own protection and, in the case of MONUSCO, as part of its protection of civilians mandate.¹⁰ Similarly, the Council requested UNIFIL to keep prioritizing the development of an annual strategic communications strategy and an annual strategy to counter disinformation and misinformation.¹¹

In the context of the ongoing political transition in South Sudan, the Council made several adjustments to the role of UNMISS in supporting the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the peace agreement and the holding of free, fair and peaceful elections. In that regard, the Council tasked UNMISS with using its good offices to prevent further escalation of political violence and to address the root causes of conflict, to uphold the view of elections as a phased approach that must first focus on the creation of conditions conducive to civic and political space, transitional security arrangements, and an inclusive constitution review process, as well as assist the parties with ensuring the meaningful, diverse and effective engagement of civil society, youth and other marginalized groups as part of the process.¹² Meanwhile, in view of upcoming local elections in the Central African Republic in 2024 and 2025, the Council underscored the role of MINUSCA to support the establishment of interim security and administrative arrangements, including through decentralization, which could create an environment conducive to the extension of state-provided basic social services and long-term socioeconomic opportunities.¹³ As part of the Mission's support to the upcoming electoral process, the Council also requested MINUSCA to support efforts to ensure the full,

⁸ Resolution [2690 \(2023\)](#), para. 5.

⁹ Resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph and paras. 34 (i)(f) and (g).

¹⁰ In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2690 \(2023\)](#), para. 6 (vi); and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), paras. 27 and 34 (i)(f).

¹¹ Resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), para. 23.

¹² Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), paras., 3 (c)(i), (ii) and (iv).

¹³ Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 36 (b)(i).

equal, meaningful participation of women, youth, returnees, internally displaced persons and refugees.¹⁴

Finally, with regard to cross-cutting issues, the Council requested MINUSCA to continue strengthening its sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response activities and to take fully into account gender mainstreaming through its mandate, prioritizing the full implementation of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and all resolutions addressing women and peace and security.¹⁵ The Council also requested MINUSCA to continue implementing the youth, peace and security resolutions [2250 \(2015\)](#), [2419 \(2018\)](#) and [2535 \(2020\)](#) and, as part of its child protection mandate, to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on the children and armed conflict in the Central African Republic and of the Mission's child protection section.¹⁶

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2023 and show the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during reporting period. The tables include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions during previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 37 (b).

¹⁵ Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 51.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 45 and 50.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2023: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force		X	X	X		X
Ceasefire monitoring	X			X		X
Civil-military coordination		X		X		X
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	X	X		X		X
Human rights-related ^a		X	X	X		X
Humanitarian support	X	X	X	X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X		X
Mission impact assessment		X		X		X
Political process		X	X	X		X
Protection of civilians		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X			X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X		X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform		X				X
Support to military		X		X		X
Support to police	X	X	X	X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X		X		X
Support to State institutions		X		X		X

Abbreviations: MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Table 2
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2023: Asia, Europe and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII			X			
Authorization of the use of force						X
Ceasefire monitoring	X	X		X	X	X
Civil-military coordination			X			
Demilitarization and arms management						
Electoral assistance						
Human rights-related ^b		X	X			X
Humanitarian support		X	X			
International cooperation and coordination		X	X	X	X	X
Political process		X	X			
Protection of civilians						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment						X
Public information						X
Rule of law/judicial matters						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence						X
Security sector reform						
Support to military						X
Support to police		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes						
Support to State institutions			X			

Abbreviations: UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations

As illustrated in table 3, during the period under review, the Council modified the composition of MONUSCO by authorizing, from 1 July 2024 onwards, a decrease from 1,350 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,410 personnel of formed police units to 11,500 military personnel, 600 military observers and staff officers, 443 police personnel and 1,270 personnel of formed police units.

Table 3
Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2023

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
MONUSCO	From 1 July 2024, the Council decided to decrease the military component from 13,500 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers to 11,500 military personnel and 600 military observers and staff officers	Resolution 2717 (2023)
	From 1 July 2024, the Council decided to decrease the police component from 591 police personnel and 1,410 personnel of formed police units to 443 police personnel and 1,270 personnel of formed police units	

Abbreviations: MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Africa

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The Council established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#) of 29 April 1991, in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). MINURSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.¹⁷

In 2023, by resolution [2703 \(2023\)](#) of 30 October, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until 31 October 2024.¹⁸ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by Mozambique and the Russian Federation.¹⁹ The Council did not modify the mandate or composition of MINURSO during the period under review.

¹⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous supplements covering the period 1991-2022. For more information on the situation concerning Western Sahara, see part I, sect. 1.

¹⁸ Resolution [2703 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹ See [S/PV.9460](#). Explaining the abstention, the representative of Mozambique expressed concern that resolution [2703 \(2023\)](#) would not assist the parties in achieving a just, lasting and mutually accepted political solution, as originally intended, but heralded a gradual shift away from the mandate and only postponed addressing core issues that needed to be dealt with. The representative of the Russian Federation argued that resolution [2703 \(2023\)](#) did not reflect the real situation on the ground that had taken shape in the Western Sahara settlement process and was unlikely to contribute to the efforts of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to resume a direct negotiation process between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO to achieve mutually acceptable solution.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Council established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#) of 28 May 2010, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUCO). MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with stabilization and peace consolidation.²⁰

In 2023, the Council adopted a presidential statement on 16 October and resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#) of 19 December in connection with the mandate of MONUSCO. In the presidential statement, the Council took full note of the report of the Secretary-General of 2 August submitted pursuant to paragraph 44 of resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#),²¹ and the letter dated 1 September 2023 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,²² on the accelerated withdrawal of MONUSCO from the end of 2023, and expressed its readiness to decide by the end of 2023 on the Mission's future, its gradual, responsible and sustainable withdrawal and the concrete and realistic steps to be undertaken, as a matter of priority to implement that withdrawal.²³ The Council encouraged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations to develop by November 2023 a comprehensive disengagement plan and proposals for the chronology of the progressive and orderly withdrawal of MONUSCO's troops, the gradual reduction of its staff and the definition of practical modalities for the gradual transfer of tasks.²⁴

By resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of MONUSCO for a period of one year, until 20

²⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010-2022. For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 4.

²¹ See report of the Secretary-General of 2 August 2023 ([S/2023/574](#)), submitted pursuant to resolution [2666 \(2022\)](#), providing options for adapting the configuration of MONUSCO's civilian, police and military components and on the future United Nations configuration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo beyond the current mandate.

²² See [S/2023/648](#).

²³ [S/PRST/2023/5](#), fourth and fifth paragraphs.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

December 2024.²⁵ The Council reiterated the two strategic priorities of MONUSCO, namely, to protect civilians and support the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms, its authorization for MONUSCO to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate, and its decision that the Mission's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks, with the protection of civilians to be given priority.²⁶ The Council further maintained the priority tasks of MONUSCO as follows: (i) protection of civilians; (ii) disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and stabilization; and (iii) security sector reform.²⁷

The Council made several changes within the framework of the three priority tasks. In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council requested MONUSCO to build on the capacities of local communities to support the creation of a protective environment, including strengthening mechanisms for the unarmed protection of civilians, as well as to prevent and counter disinformation campaigns and misinformation, in particular during the disengagement phases.²⁸ MONUSCO was requested to maintain a protective environment for civilians throughout the disengagement phases, including by developing integrated provincial protection plans, jointly elaborated with local authorities and security services and in consultation with communities and civil society, to ensure its responsible withdrawal in line with the disengagement plan.²⁹

With respect to disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and stabilization tasks, the Council requested MONUSCO to provide good offices, advice and assistance, including for the revitalization and the implementation of the East African Community-led Nairobi process and the implementation of the Luanda agreement.³⁰ Additionally, the Council specified that the Mission would provide technical advice to the Government in the consolidation of an effective national civilian structure that controlled key mining activities and managed in an equitable and productive manner the extraction, value addition, transport and trade of natural resources in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including identifying entry points for conflict transformation through viable, safe, dignified livelihood options for ex-

²⁵ Resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), para. 29.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, paras., 31-32 and 34.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 34 (i)-(iii).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 34 (i)(f).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 34 (i)(g).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 34 (ii)(h).

combatants and their receiving communities.³¹ Furthermore, regarding security sector reform, the Council tasked MONUSCO with providing enhanced support via the United Nations Mine Action Service, to the strengthening and consolidation of the capacities of the Congolese security forces, including on weapons and ammunitions management, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, as well as on basic investigation and forensic exploitation related to improvised explosive devices, and also support the Government in finalizing, in an inclusive manner, the national security policy and security sector reform strategy.³²

Regarding the effectiveness of the Mission and safety and security of peacekeepers, the Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to implement the activities listed in paragraph 42 of resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#) in the planning and conduct of MONUSCO's operations.³³ Furthermore, while noting with concern the serious, including recent, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Mission area, the Council requested troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate disciplinary measures and reiterated its call on the Secretary-General, in line with resolutions [2272 \(2016\)](#) and [2436 \(2018\)](#) to repatriate units where there was credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by those units.³⁴ The Council also called on the United Nations to provide appropriate oversight and investigations, where applicable, of all Mission personnel.³⁵

Concerning the drawdown of MONUSCO, the Council took full note of the comprehensive disengagement plan submitted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations in line with [S/PRST/2023/5](#) and decided to initiate the gradual, responsible and sustainable withdrawal of the mission from the country and implement the gradual handover of responsibilities to the Government.³⁶ It further decided that MONUSCO would withdraw its Force from South Kivu by the end of April 2024 and limit the implementation of its mandate to the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri

³¹ Ibid., para. 34 (ii)(k).

³² Ibid., para. 34 (iii)(m).

³³ Ibid., para. 45.

³⁴ Ibid., para. 46.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., para. 22. See letter dated 23 November 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a comprehensive disengagement plan and proposals concerning a timeline for the accelerated, gradual and orderly withdrawal of MONUSCO troops, the gradual reduction of the mission's civilian personnel, and the streamlined transfer of its tasks to the institutions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see [S/2023/904](#)).

from May 2024 until the end of the current mandate, and authorized the Mission to maintain a sufficient residual civilian presence in South Kivu in order to ensure an orderly withdrawal from that province and a smooth and responsible transfer of responsibilities to the Congolese authorities.³⁷ The Council requested the Government and the United Nations to provide by 30 June 2024, in coordination with relevant stakeholders, including in liaison with civil society, an update on the implementation of the disengagement plan, and proposals for the next steps of the gradual, responsible and sustainable withdrawal of the Mission.³⁸ Moreover, the Council expressed its readiness to consider further steps in this regard at the end of this first phase based upon progress towards satisfying the objectives and criteria set out in the plan and taking into consideration the situation on the ground.³⁹ In this context, while underlining the importance, in transition settings, of a proactive approach to strategic communications, the Council requested MONUSCO to strengthen its communication efforts to support the implementation of its mandate, enhance its protection and raise awareness of its mandate and role.⁴⁰

Finally, the Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 1 July 2024 onwards from 13,500 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,410 personnel of formed police units to 11,500 military personnel, 600 military observers and staff officers, 443 police personnel and 1,270 personnel of formed police units.⁴¹ In addition to his regular periodic reporting, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report by 30 June 2024 on possible logistical and operational support the United Nations could provide to regional forces present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁴²

³⁷ Resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), para. 23.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 24.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 27.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

⁴² *Ibid.* paras. 47 and 48.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary to, inter alia, protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and ensure security in the Abyei Area. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM).⁴³

In 2023, by resolution [2708 \(2023\)](#) of 14 November, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNISFA for one year, until 15 November 2024.⁴⁴

The Council did not modify the mandate of UNISFA during the period under review. By the same resolution, while maintaining the authorized troop and police ceilings as set out in resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), the Council expressed its intention to remain seized of the recommendations of the strategic review as contained in the letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council.⁴⁵

⁴³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous supplements covering the period 2011-2022. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

⁴⁴ Resolution [2708 \(2023\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 3. See also [S/2021/805](#).

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law and strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.⁴⁶

In 2023, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2677 \(2023\)](#) of 15 March and [2683 \(2023\)](#) of 30 May in connection with the mandate of UNMISS. By resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for a period of one year, until 15 March 2024.⁴⁷ Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by China and the Russian Federation.⁴⁸

By resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), the Council reiterated that the mandate of UNMISS was designed to advance the three-year strategic vision defined in resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#) to prevent a return to civil war in South Sudan, to build durable peace at the local and national levels, and to support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.⁴⁹ The Council reiterated its authorization to UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement its mandate and stressed that the protection of civilian should be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous supplements covering the period 2011-2022. For more information on the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan,” see part I, sect. 7.

⁴⁷ Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.9281](#). In their statements after the vote, the representatives of China and the Russian Federation expressed concern with, among other issues, the changes to the protection of civilians mandate of UNMISS and stressed the need for coordination with the host country.

⁴⁹ Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), para. 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

The Council modified the mandate of UNMISS, placing special emphasis on the protection of civilians, supporting the creation of conditions conducive to the completion of the political transition and the holding of elections, and human rights. Specifically, the Council requested UNMISS to use all necessary means to ensure effective, timely and dynamic protection of civilians under threat of physical violence through a comprehensive and integrated approach.⁵¹ UNMISS was requested to prevent violence irrespective of its source, in addition to deterring and stopping it, including politically driven violence, particularly in high-risk areas.⁵² UNMISS would be required to maintain a proactive deployment and a mobile, flexible, robust and effective posturing, including by conducting active patrolling by foot and by vehicle, in particular in high risk areas, internally displaced persons camps and the UNMISS protection of civilians site.⁵³ Moreover, the Council requested UNMISS to identify and deter threats and attacks against civilians and to track, analyze and report on the rate and effectiveness of its protection of civilians responses and ensure that risks of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations were included in its data collection, threat analysis and early warning system.⁵⁴ The Council tasked UNMISS with protecting civilians in re-designated protection of civilians sites, while maintaining a flexible posture linked to threat analysis to rapidly respond to threats in other locations, to promptly develop contingency plans for protecting civilians in both the protection of civilians and re-designated sites in a crisis.⁵⁵ The Council also specifically requested UNMISS to actively intervene to protect civilians threatened by and survivors of sexual violence, irrespective of its source.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the Council newly requested the Mission to monitor and report the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandate tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and consistent with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations.⁵⁷ Finally, as part of its tasks related to the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the Council requested UNMISS to undertake explosive ordnance risk mitigation and clearance.⁵⁸

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(i).

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(ii).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 3 (a)(vi).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3 (b)(ii).

Under the Mission's third set of tasks related to the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, the Council requested UNMISS to use good offices to support the peace process and the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the agreement and the Agreement on the Roadmap to a Peaceful and Democratic end of the Transition Period, to prevent further escalation of political violence and address the root causes of conflict, and in particular to learn from the National Dialogue to generate significant political reform and continue a South Sudanese dialogue about how to encourage power-sharing and peaceful political competition.⁵⁹ UNMISS was further tasked with using good offices to assist the Government of South Sudan and other relevant parties in upholding the view of elections as a phased approach that must first focus on supporting the creation of conditions conducive to civic and political space, transitional security arrangements, and an inclusive constitutional review process for an eventual political transition, including through technical assistance and capacity-building, to support mechanisms of the Revitalized Agreement.⁶⁰ Moreover, the Mission's support for the electoral process would also include providing technical assistance focused on creating conditions for civic and political space and legal frameworks.⁶¹ The Mission would also promote an open, free, inclusive and safe civic space and ensure that the protection, rights, well-being and empowerment of children affected by armed conflict were fully incorporated in political processes, as well as their views and needs considered in their design.⁶² In addition, UNMISS would also be required to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces and government officials was informed by robust conflict-sensitive analysis and provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and that capacity-building support to civilian institutions was informed by conflict sensitive analysis.⁶³

With regard to inclusivity in the political process, the Council requested UNMISS to assist the parties in ensuring, in addition to the participation of women, the meaningful, diverse and effective engagement of civil society, youth and other marginalized groups.⁶⁴ The Council further specified that this participation and engagement in the political process should include

⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 3 (c)(i).

⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 3 (c)(iv).

⁶¹ Ibid., para. 3 (c)(v).

⁶² Ibid., para. 3 (c)(ii).

⁶³ Ibid., para. 3 (c)(viii).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

electoral, judicial, legislative and institutional reform and security sector transformation.⁶⁵ It should further promote an open, free, inclusive and safe civic space, and ensure that the protection, rights, well-being and empowerment of children affected by armed conflict were fully incorporated in these processes and their views and needs considered in the design.⁶⁶ Additionally, UNMISS would, besides the South Sudanese Government authorities, also support non-governmental organizations in efforts to draft a permanent constitution, mitigate the potential for tensions throughout the electoral period and provide for the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women candidates and voters, including young voters, at all levels and in all phases of the electoral process.⁶⁷ The Mission was requested to further use technical assistance and capacity-building to support non-governmental South Sudanese to strengthen, expand and reform all components of the rule of law and justice sector.⁶⁸

The Council also introduced additional elements into the human rights mandate of UNMISS and requested it to, where possible, monitor, investigate, verify and report immediately, publicly and regularly on the chains of command the decision-making structures that led to abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those that may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the Council specified that the Mission's work on monitoring, investigating, verifying and reporting on sexual and gender-based violence would include conflict-related sexual violence and that, as part of its human rights work, it would coordinate with, share appropriate information with, and provide technical support to both community and national mechanisms engaged in monitoring, investigating, prosecuting and reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses.⁷⁰

The Council did not modify the composition of UNMISS during the period under review and reiterated its readiness to consider adjustments to force levels and capacity-building tasks based on security conditions on the ground and implementation of priority measures as defined in paragraph 9 of the resolution and related to steps taken by the Government of South Sudan and all relevant actors in the protection of civilians, creating a conducive political environment

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 3 (c)(v).

⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 3 (c)(vii)

⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 3 (d)(i).

⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 3 (d)(iv).

for elections, ending obstructions to UNMISS, implementing security arrangements and measures related to transitional justice.⁷¹

Stressing the importance of a proactive, robust military posture to deter, prevent and respond to threats of violence against civilians, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide, no later than 15 October, a separate independently conducted impact assessment on the Mission's implementation of its protection of civilians mandate with a focus on its strategy following the redesignation of several protection of civilians sites, troop and police mindset, whole of mission integration, and any obstacles to the Mission being able to fulfil its mandate, including obstruction by host Government or other forces.⁷² The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide, no later than 15 October, a separate report including an assessment and a detailed analysis of the political, security and economic factors delaying the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and their causes, an assessment of certain conditions and/or indicators, and recommendations for how UNMISS might adapt in light of the findings of the report.⁷³ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide an analysis of risks associated with climate change that could adversely impact peace and security in South Sudan, and the implementation of the UNMISS mandate, as part of his regular periodic reporting cycle.⁷⁴

By resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to assist the Committee and Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan sanctions.⁷⁵

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 4 and 9.

⁷² *Ibid.*, para. 30. See also special report of the Secretary-General dated 17 October 2023, providing an assessment and analysis of the political, security and economic factors delaying the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, including its recommendations on possible adaptations of UNMISS ([S/2023/784](#)). See letter dated 4 December 2023 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the report of the impact assessment of the UNMISS protection of civilians mandate (see [S/2023/955](#)), including recommendations that could assist the Mission in enhancing its work in this regard. The deadline for the submission of the impact assessment was extended further to an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (see [S/2023/681](#) and [S/2023/682](#)).

⁷³ Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), para. 31.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 32.

⁷⁵ Resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), para. 23. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice, and cultural preservation.⁷⁶

In 2023, by resolution [2690 \(2023\)](#) of 30 June, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter and taking note of the letter of the Transition Government of Mali requesting the Mission's withdrawal without delay, the Council unanimously decided to terminate the mandate of MINUSMA as of the same date.⁷⁷

The Council requested MINUSMA to immediately start on 1 July the cessation of its operations, transfer of its tasks, as well as the orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal of its personnel, with the objective of completing this process by 31 December.⁷⁸ The Council requested the Secretary-General to engage with the Transition Government to articulate a plan for the transfer of the Mission's tasks, bearing in mind the possible contribution of the United Nations country team, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and other stakeholders, including in support of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, and to present it to the Council by 15 August.⁷⁹ The Council called on MINUSMA to establish with the United Nations country team and UNOWAS as appropriate, financial arrangement enabling the United Nations to oversee, after its withdrawal, the residual activities of programmatic cooperation previously initiated by the Mission.⁸⁰

With regard to the mandate of MINUSMA, the Council decided that, until 30 September, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities and in consultation with

⁷⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2012-2022. For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 11.

⁷⁷ Resolution [2690 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3. See also letter dated 18 August 2023 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the plan for the transfer of tasks of MINUSMA (see [S/2023/611](#)).

⁸⁰ Resolution [2690 \(2023\)](#), para. 8.

them, and acting within its means and capabilities in its immediate vicinity, MINUSMA was authorized to respond to imminent threats of violence to civilians and contribute to the safe civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁸¹ The Council further authorized the Mission to, until 31 December, fulfil six functions within its capabilities and its area of operation in Mali, in cooperation and consultation with the Transition Government: (i) to provide security for United Nations personnel, facilities, convoys, installations and equipment and associated personnel; (ii) to maintain situation awareness in the vicinity of MINUSMA locations; (iii) to provide escort for United Nations uniformed and civilian personnel carrying out enabling support functions; (iv) to execute operations in order to extract United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers in danger; (v) to provide medical support, including casualty and medical evacuation support, for United Nations personnel; and (vi) to maintain effective strategic communication to enhance its protection.⁸²

The Council decided that the liquidation of MINUSMA would begin on 1 January 2024 and authorized, for the duration of the process, the retention of a guard unit from within the Mission's existing footprint to protect its personnel, facilities and assets.⁸³ The Council further requested MINUSMA to ensure that its team sites and assets were handed over in full compliance with general United Nations practices and financial regulations.⁸⁴ Finally, the Council called upon the Transition Government to cooperate fully with the United Nations during the Mission's drawdown, withdrawal and liquidation to ensure the orderly and safe withdrawal and requested it to fully respect all provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement until the departure of the final element of MINUSMA from Mali.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Ibid., para. 5.

⁸² Ibid., para. 6.

⁸³ Ibid., para. 7.

⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 8.

⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 4.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#) of 10 April 2014, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation strategies.⁸⁶

In 2023, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#) of 15 November, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA for a period of one year, until 15 November 2024.⁸⁷ The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and an abstention by the Russian Federation.⁸⁸

By resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), the Council reiterated that the mandate of MINUSCA was designed to advance a multiyear strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions to national reconciliation and durable peace through the implementation of the Political Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping.⁸⁹ The Council recalled that the mandate of MINUSCA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks and, when relevant, in a sequenced manner.⁹⁰ Furthermore, while reiterating the Mission's priority tasks to protect civilians, provide good offices and support to the peace process, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protecting United Nations

⁸⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2014-2022. For more information on the situation in the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 5.

⁸⁷ Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 30.

⁸⁸ See [S/PV.9476](#). In explaining the vote of her delegation, the representative of the Russian Federation criticized the absence of any mention of the role of the bilateral partners of the Central African Republic in the stabilization of the country. She underscored that Council resolutions could not be used for interference in the internal affairs of States and noted that, many objectives, including the demand to conduct night flights, needed to be resolved by MINUSCA in close cooperation with the host country.

⁸⁹ Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 32.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 34.

personnel and equipment, the Council added to the priorities the Mission's tasks related to supporting the extension of State authority, the deployment of security forces and the preservation of territorial integrity.⁹¹

Within those priority tasks, the Council made several adjustments. Specifically, under the protection of civilians priority, the Council provided that MINUSCA's support to the Central African Republic authorities in the prevention, mitigation and response to the threat posed by explosive ordnance should include the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices, the capacity building of the Forces armées centrafricaines, and in coordination with other United Nations agencies and international partners, including the United Nations Mine Action Service.⁹² As part of its support for the extension of State authority, MINUSCA was requested to support the establishment of interim security and administrative arrangements, including through decentralization, which could create an environment conducive to the extension of state-provided basic social services and long-term socioeconomic opportunities.⁹³ Moreover, the Council specified that the Mission's support for the deployment of vetted and trained national security forces in priority areas was to be carried out within available capacities and resources.⁹⁴

Beyond the priority tasks, the Council reiterated, with a few modifications, the other tasks of MINUSCA on (a) the promotion and protection of human rights; (b) the follow-up to the Republic Dialogue and elections; (c) security sector reform; (d) disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation; and (e) support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity, and the rule of law.⁹⁵ Specifically, with regard to elections, MINUSCA would assist the Central African Republic authorities in the preparation and delivery of free, fair and peaceful local elections in 2024 and 2025, in a transparent, credible, peaceful and timely manner and with the full, equal, meaningful participation of women, youth, returnees, internally displaced persons and refugees.⁹⁶ The Council also requested timely reports to the Council on violations of international humanitarian law and on violations and abuses of human rights, support for community violence reduction programmes to be in line with the National

⁹¹ Ibid., para. 36.

⁹² Ibid., para. 36 (a)(iii).

⁹³ Ibid., para. 36 (b)(i).

⁹⁴ Ibid., para. 36 (b)(ii).

⁹⁵ Ibid., para. 37 (a)-(e).

⁹⁶ Ibid., para. 37 (b).

Development Plan for 2024-2028, and for the Mission to coordinate support with, among other actors, the African Development Bank.⁹⁷ In addition, the Council reiterated the additional tasks of MINUSCA to support the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic and its Panel of Experts.⁹⁸

The Council also made several modifications regarding the cross-cutting tasks of MINUSCA. In this regard, the Council requested the Mission to continue implementing the youth, peace and security resolutions [2250 \(2015\)](#), [2419 \(2018\)](#) and [2535 \(2020\)](#) and, as part of its child protection mandate, to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on the children and armed conflict in the Central African Republic and of the Mission's child protection section.⁹⁹ Moreover, the Council requested MINUSCA to continue strengthening its sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response activities in line with resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#), including by assisting the parties with activities consistent with resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), and to prioritize the full implementation of resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#) and [2538 \(2020\)](#) and all resolutions addressing women, peace and security.¹⁰⁰

With respect to the effectiveness of MINUSCA, the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement the capacities and existing obligations mentioned in paragraph 43 of resolution [2659 \(2022\)](#) in the planning and conduct of MINUSCA's operations, including improving its intelligence and analysis capacities and strengthening the implementation of a mission-wide early warning and response strategy and prioritizing enhanced mission mobility, and also improving strategic communications and mission air and ground transportation and logistics capacity and management.¹⁰¹ The Council also encouraged continued efforts to improve communication and coordination between the Central African Republic authorities and MINUSCA, including on the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement and security coordination, and strengthened established coordination mechanisms.¹⁰²

Regarding the composition and configuration of MINUSCA, the Council decided that the Mission would continue to comprise up to 14,400 military personnel, including 580 military

⁹⁷ Ibid., paras. 37 (a)i, (d)(ii) and (iv).

⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 38 (a)-(d). For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

⁹⁹ Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), paras. 45 and 50.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., para. 51.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., para. 43.

¹⁰² Ibid., para. 44.

observers and military staff officers, and 3,020 police personnel, including 600 individual police officers and 2,420 formed police units personnel, as well as 108 corrections officers, and recalled its intention to keep this number under continuous review, taking into account progress on the security situation and the objective transition and eventual drawdown of the Mission when conditions were met.¹⁰³ Furthermore, by an exchange of letters dated 9 and 12 May, the Council appointed Major General Humphrey Zone as the Force Commander of MINUSCA.¹⁰⁴

In addition to its periodic reporting, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct and provide no later than 15 August 2024, with an independent strategic review of MINUSCA which assessed the challenges to peace and security in the Central African Republic and provided detailed recommendations regarding the possible reconfiguration of the Mission's mandate, on the Mission's effectiveness, adequation of resources, and options for gradually adapting its civilian, police and military components, as appropriate, as well as recommendations for a possible transition plan and eventual drawdown of MINUSCA when conditions were met.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Ibid., para. 31.

¹⁰⁴ See [S/2023/350](#) and [S/2023/351](#).

¹⁰⁵ Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 57 (c).

Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution [47 \(1948\)](#) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution [39 \(1948\)](#). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution [91 \(1951\)](#), decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. In 2023, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946-1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952-2022.

Europe

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution [186 \(1964\)](#) of 4 March 1964. In the interest of preserving international peace and security, UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.¹⁰⁷

In 2023, by resolution [2674 \(2023\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNFICYP for a period of one year, until 31 January 2024.¹⁰⁸

The Council did not modify the mandate or composition of UNFICYP. By its resolution, the Council further affirmed its intention to continue to monitor the situation in Cyprus and its readiness to review the implementation of this resolution after six months and to consider any adjustments or other actions as necessary, taking into account the advice of the Secretary-General.¹⁰⁹

Regarding the Mission's operations, the Council stressed that the mandate authority of UNFICYP extended throughout Cyprus and called on all parties to cooperate with the mission and strongly urged full respect for its freedom of movement.¹¹⁰ The Council further reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to implement six activities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of UNFICYP operations with the limits of the mandate and operations.¹¹¹ The Council also noted the Environment Strategy (phase II) of the Department of Operational Support, which emphasized good stewardship of resources and a positive legacy of the Mission, identifying the goal of expanded renewable energy use in missions to enhance safety and security, save costs, offer efficiencies and benefit the Mission.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ For further information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous supplements covering the period 1964-2022. For more information on the situation in Cyprus, see part I, sect. 18.

¹⁰⁸ Resolution [2674 \(2023\)](#), para. 10.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 17 (a)-(f).

¹¹² *Ibid.*, para. 20.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on 10 June 1999, by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.¹¹³ In 2023, the Council did not adopt any decisions relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous supplements covering the period 1996-2022.

¹¹⁴ For more information on Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#), see part I, sect. 19 B.

Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of UNTSO, the Council has assigned it different tasks without formally changing its mandate, including the supervision of the General Armistice, the supervision of the armistice following the Suez war, the supervision of the armistice between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai, and the supervision of the truce between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, in collaboration with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), respectively.¹¹⁵

In 2023, the Council did not make changes to the composition or mandate of UNTSO, which remained open-ended.

¹¹⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire 1946-1951* and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952-2022. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 21.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.¹¹⁶

In 2023, by resolutions [2689 \(2023\)](#) of 29 June and [2718 \(2023\)](#) of 21 December, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNDOF for periods of six months, the second time until 30 June 2024.¹¹⁷

The Council did not make changes to the mandate or composition of UNDOF. In resolutions [2689 \(2023\)](#) and [2718 \(2023\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to the Mission, within existing capacities and resources, to take all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all Mission personnel, in line with resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#).¹¹⁸ The Council further encouraged the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review of UNDOF to improve Mission performance and implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous supplements covering the period 1972-2022.

¹¹⁷ Resolutions [2689 \(2023\)](#) and [2718 \(2023\)](#), para. 15.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 12. See [S/2018/1088](#), which provides an overview of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mission's mandate.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. By resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), to address the continuing hostilities in Lebanon, the Council expanded the mandate of UNIFIL to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities; accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed forces; extending its assistance to help to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; and assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel.¹²⁰

In 2023, by resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#) of 31 August, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of one year, until 31 August 2024.¹²¹ The resolution was adopted further to the letter dated 3 August addressed to the President of the Council recommending the extension of the mandate of the Mission.¹²² The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by China and the Russian Federation.¹²³

By resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Council reiterated the existing mandate of UNIFIL, with one addition. Specifically, while commending the Mission's operational changes in line with resolutions [2373 \(2017\)](#) and [2433 \(2018\)](#) and the adoption in February 2023 of a strategy to address misinformation and disinformation in line with resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested UNIFIL to keep prioritizing the development of an annual strategic communications strategy and an annual strategy to counter disinformation and misinformation.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous supplements covering the period 1975-2022. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question and the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sects. 20 and 21.

¹²¹ Resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹²² *Ibid.*, sixth preambular paragraph.

¹²³ See [S/PV.9409](#). In their statements after the vote, the representatives of the China and the Russian Federation underscored the importance of respecting the sovereignty and opinions of the host country and strengthening the coordination between UNIFIL and the Government of Lebanon. For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 21.

¹²⁴ Resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), para. 23.

Regarding the Mission's operations, the Council underscored that, pursuant to the Agreement on the Status of UNIFIL with the Government of Lebanon, UNIFIL did not require prior authorization or permission to undertake its mandated tasks and that it was authorized to conduct its operations independently, while continuing to coordinate with the Government of Lebanon, as per the agreement.¹²⁵ The Council also called on the Government to facilitate UNIFIL's prompt and full access to sites requested by the Mission for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest and unauthorized firing ranges.¹²⁶ Moreover, the Council also underscored that the sustainability of peace and security supports was improved by the implementation of the United Nations Department of Operational Support's Environmental Strategy (Phase II), which emphasized good stewardship of resources and a positive legacy of the Mission, and identified the goal of expanded renewal energy use in Mission to enhance safety and security, save costs, offer efficiencies and benefit the Mission.¹²⁷

The Council did not modify the composition or configuration of UNIFIL during the period under review.

¹²⁵ Ibid., para. 15.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., para. 25.

II. Special political missions

Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,¹²⁸ as well as the changes to their mandates.¹²⁹

Overview of special political missions during 2023

In 2023, the Council oversaw 12 special political missions considered in this part of the Repertoire. Five were based in Africa, three in the Middle East, and two each in the Americas and Asia. Their nature varied from regional offices, missions with limited mandates to monitor and support the implementation of ceasefires and peace agreements, to larger assistance missions.

Terminations and extensions of mandates

In 2023, by resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#), the Council terminated the mandate of UNITAMS as of 3 December 2023.¹³⁰ The Council also extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. The mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was renewed in 2021 for a period of three years until 31 August 2024.¹³¹ The

¹²⁸ Special political missions described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as offices of special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in parts VII and IX of the present Supplement.

¹²⁹ For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping operations or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

¹³⁰ Resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹³¹ See [S/2019/1009](#) and [S/2020/85](#). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. II.

mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) and the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) remained open-ended.

Mandates of special political missions: differences in scope

In 2023, for most special political missions, the Council reiterated without significant modification existing mandates which prioritized good offices and technical support for the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and national and local-level reconciliation, and political transitions involving elections and constitutional review processes. The Council underlined the importance of strengthening good governance and the capacity of national institutions to deliver basic services and implement reform agendas, including justice and security sector reform, as well as providing support for the promotion and protection of human rights and of ensuring accountability. As part of those priorities, most missions were mandated to coordinate and support the mobilization of humanitarian and development assistance among a broad spectrum of United Nations, international, regional and sub-regional partners and stakeholders. Moreover, gender mainstreaming, including ensuring the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in political-decision making, as well as the protection of children, were the most common cross-cutting element of mandates.

Regional offices, namely, UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to monitor and analyse emerging threats to peace and security, support the strengthening of local capacities for conflict prevention and management and early warning, promote inclusive political dialogue and reform processes and improve governance, provide electoral support and help to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues and challenges such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, illicit trafficking, transhumance and conflicts between farmers and herders, and the security implications of climate change. The mandates of BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia placed particular emphasis on, respectively, capacity-building of national justice and rule of law institutions and the political, economic and social reincorporation of former members of armed groups. UNMHA further retained its relatively narrow mandate to oversee and facilitate the implementation of ceasefire arrangements.

Mandates of special political missions: modifications

In 2023, the Council modified the mandates of six out of the 12 active special political missions, namely, BINUH, UNAMI, UNOWAS, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

Specifically, further to the request of the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP), the Council continued to expand the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission to support the implementation of other parts of the Colombian peace agreement which, in this instance, included the provisions on comprehensive rural reform and ethnic issues.¹³² Following the signing of a ceasefire between the Government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in June 2023, the Council also tasked the Mission with monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire.¹³³ In Libya and Somalia, the Council specifically requested UNSMIL and UNSOM to support confidence-building in reconciliation following violence in Benghazi and Tripoli, and in Laascaanoon in the Sool region of Northern Somalia.¹³⁴ Moreover, while reiterating its existing four objectives, the Council expanded upon the mandate tasks of UNOWAS by requesting the Office to monitor and analyze the impact of underlying causes of conflict in West Africa and the Sahel and to perform good offices to prevent transition-related tensions.¹³⁵ With regard to electoral support, the Council requested UNAMI to advise, support and assist the Iraqi Government with preparation for provincial elections and elections for the Kurdistan regional parliament.¹³⁶

The Council continued to place significant emphasis on the need for inclusivity in political processes and peace agreements. For example, in renewing the mandate of UNAMI, the Council requested the Mission to take into account civil society and youth input in its work on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation, as well as to consult with diverse women's civil society groups.¹³⁷ UNOWAS was requested to conduct gender-sensitive analysis in several aspects of its work and to facilitate the full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women, young people and other relevant

¹³² Resolution [2673 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹³³ Resolution [2694 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹³⁴ In connection with UNSMIL, resolution [2702 \(2023\)](#), para. 9; and, in connection with UNSOM, resolution [2705 \(2023\)](#), para. 4.

¹³⁵ [S/2023/70](#), annex, functions 1.1 and 1.2.

¹³⁶ Resolution [2682 \(2023\)](#), para. 2 (b)(i).

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 2 (a) and (e).

stakeholders.¹³⁸ The Council also newly tasked BINUH to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate.¹³⁹

Furthermore, as part of its work on addressing cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security in the region, the Council requested UNOWAS to support efforts to address conflict concerning natural resources management, as well as piracy and other forms of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea.¹⁴⁰ In connection with the mandate of UNSOM, the Council highlighted the importance of the United Nations and the Somali authorities considering the adverse implication of climate change, environmental degradation, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia.¹⁴¹

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2023, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the period under review; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

¹³⁸ [S/2023/70](#), annex, functions 2.3, 3.2 and 4.1.

¹³⁹ Resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), para. 3.

¹⁴⁰ [S/2023/70](#), annex, function 2.2.

¹⁴¹ Resolution [2705 \(2023\)](#), para. 12.

Table 4
Mandates of special political missions, 2023: Africa

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>	<i>UNITAMS</i>
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring		X			X
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights-related ^a	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support		X			X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security	X		X	X	
Mission impact assessment					
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians			X		X
Public information		X		X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform			X	X	X
Support to military			X		X
Support to police			X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X			X
Support to State institutions		X	X		X

Abbreviations: UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Table 5
Mandates of special political missions, 2023: Americas, Asia and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Chapter VII							
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X
Civilian-military coordination			X				
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X		X
Electoral assistance		X	X		X		
Human rights-related ^a		X	X		X		
Humanitarian support			X		X		
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Protection of civilians			X				
Public information		X					
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X		X		
Security monitoring – patrolling – Deterrence							X
Security sector reform					X		
Support to police		X					
Support to sanctions regimes		X	X				
Support to State institutions		X	X		X		

Abbreviations: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Africa

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.¹⁴² The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance. UNOCA was subsequently mandated to promote efforts to address emerging security and cross-border threats, incorporate gender perspectives in the implementation of its mandate and to take into consideration climate and ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region in its activities.¹⁴³

In 2023, the Council did not adopt any decisions concerning UNOCA. The mandate of the Office had previously been renewed from 1 September 2021 to 31 August 2024 by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² [S/2009/697](#) and [S/2010/457](#).

¹⁴³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2008-2022. For more information on the situation in the Central African region, see part I, sect. 6.

¹⁴⁴ [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#).

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.¹⁴⁵

In 2023, by resolution [2702 \(2023\)](#) of 30 October, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNSMIL as set out in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and paragraph 16 of resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#) for a period of one year, until 31 October 2024.¹⁴⁶

While reiterating its request for UNSMIL to implement the recommendations of the independent strategic review ([S/2021/716](#)), the Council further requested the Mission to explore all avenues to increase efficiency and redeploy existing resources, including through prioritization and reconfiguration of tasks and resources, as need and where appropriate, in particular in order to facilitate an effective, sustainable political process and with a focus on expanding its footprint and operations in eastern Libya.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, while calling upon all parties to refrain from violence or any other actions that could escalate tensions, exacerbate conflicts, endanger civilians and undermine the political process or the 23 October 2020 ceasefire and recalling the violent clashes in Tripoli in August and in Benghazi in early October 2023, the Council requested UNSMIL, in line with its existing mandate and resources, to facilitate confidence building measures, dialogue and reconciliation between armed actors to prevent violence and conflict escalation through the Mission's mediation and good offices.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous supplements covering the period 2010–2022. For more information on the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 10.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution [2702 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

By resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#) of 2 May 2013, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with the mandate, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state building; assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the strengthening of justice institutions; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.¹⁴⁹

In 2023, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2687 \(2023\)](#) of 27 June and [2705 \(2023\)](#) of 31 October concerning the mandate of UNSOM. By resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), while extending the authorizations granted to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the Council recalled the role of UNSOM in coordinating capacity-building support provided by UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to Somalia, and encouraged continued engagement with the country's bilateral partners to understand wider capacity-building support provision and ensuring alignment where possible.¹⁵⁰ The Council further requested UNSOM and UNSOS, in full consultation with the Government of Somalia, to define the logistical and enabling tasks that would need to be transitioned to Somalia when ATMIS departed, and to support Somalia in planning for and developing its sovereign capacity in the areas of procurement, supply chain management, logistics and warehouse operations, engineering, weapons and ammunition management, including obsolescence management, and human resources management.¹⁵¹

By resolution [2705 \(2023\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM as set out in resolutions [2158 \(2014\)](#) and [2592 \(2021\)](#) for a period of one year, until 31 October 2024.¹⁵² While reiterating its request to UNSOM to continue to maintain and strengthen its presence

¹⁴⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous supplements covering the period 2013-2022. For more information on the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2. For more information on the mandate of ATMIS, see part VIII, sect. III.

¹⁵⁰ Resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), para. 28.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para. 29.

¹⁵² Resolution [2705 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

across Somalia, the Council emphasized that this should be done in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, and also requested the Mission to strengthen its cooperation with Somalia and the African Union.¹⁵³ The Council further encouraged UNSOM to continue to coordinate United Nations efforts, maximize joint approaches and joint programming in relevant areas, in full cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, to support them in their efforts to: (a) take a realistic, incremental approach to advance State-building, including the development of its federal system and the constitutional review process, and ensuring the participation and inclusion of all stakeholders, including women, youth and civil society; (b) conduct of free and fair elections, through inclusive, transparent processes at the national and local level on agreed timelines; (c) advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, working closely with the United Nations Country Team, provide strategic advice to institutional capacity-building in line with the Somalia National Development Plan and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, collaborate with international financial institutions to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance; (d) support extension of government authority and expanding its coordination role on stabilization, bringing together donor support to assist the authorities to deliver basic services and community reconciliation; (e) accelerating implementation of the National Stabilisation Strategy and State-Level Stabilisation Plans; and (f) supporting peacebuilding, including the establishment of local governance, service delivery and democratic processes; the establishment of security arrangements; and supporting Somalia to ensure that plans were in place and implemented to protect civilians and communities in areas which were the focus of military operations and ensuring timely, balanced support to all areas, including newly or recently recovered from Al-Shabaab and fragile areas.¹⁵⁴ In addition, the Council recalled its press statement of 7 June and paragraph 6 (b) of resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#) and requested UNSOM to continue providing support to efforts undertaken by the Federal Government of Somalia to pursue inter- and intra-clan reconciliation at the local, regional and national level towards the peaceful resolution of the dispute in Laascaanood and the surrounding areas, including through engaging with all parties where necessary.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 2.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 3 (a)-(f).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 4.

The Council recalled the recommendations of the strategic review of UNSOM ([S/2022/716](#)), which were endorsed subsequently by the Council, and called for their timely implementation, including planning to develop a road map for the eventual transition from UNSOM to the United Nations country team, finalizing the UNSOM staffing and configuration review and towards a common understanding of an end state.¹⁵⁶ The Council noted the Environmental Strategy of the Department of Operational Support (Phase II), which emphasized good stewardship of resources and a positive legacy of the Mission, and identified the goal of expanded renewable energy use in missions to enhance safety and security, save costs, offer efficiencies and benefit the Mission.¹⁵⁷ The Council also highlighted the importance of the United Nations, and the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states considering the adverse implications of climate change, environmental degradation, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking comprehensive, gender-sensitive risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors.¹⁵⁸

Finally, besides the Mission's regular periodic reporting, the Council requested UNSOM to provide an update on progress made in implementing the recommendations set out in the strategic review by 1 September 2024.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 13.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 5.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 12.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 14.

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and human rights and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives.¹⁶⁰

In 2023, by an exchange of letters dated 20 and 30 January between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the mandate of UNOWAS was extended for a period of three years, from 1 February 2023 to 31 January 2026.¹⁶¹

The Council reiterated the four objectives of the UNOWAS mandate, namely: (1) to monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General to support conflict prevention, peacebuilding, sustaining peace and mediation efforts in the subregion, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other national and international actors, with specific attention to countries in which the United Nations presences were undergoing reconfiguration or transition, while mindful of the sustainable development context in the region; (2) enhance regional and subregional partnerships to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular with regional and subregional entities, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Accra Initiative, the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the African Development Bank; (3) support, through political

¹⁶⁰ For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see previous supplements covering the period 2016-2022. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part I, sect. 8.

¹⁶¹ [S/2023/70](#) and [S/2023/71](#).

advocacy and playing a convening role, the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, enhance collaboration across the United Nations system and promote coherence in the international and regional response to the root causes and impact of conflict in the Sahel; and (4) promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives in West Africa and the Sahel.¹⁶²

Within the framework of those objectives, the Council modified and added several new tasks. As part of the office's first objective, the Council provided that the monitoring and analysis role of UNOWAS would also include the underlying causes of conflict in the region, in addition to emerging threats to peace and security.¹⁶³ Furthermore, in addition to conflict and election-related violence, sustaining peace and consolidating peacebuilding efforts and political stability, UNOWAS was tasked with performing good offices to prevent transition-related tensions, all of which would be based on the rule of law.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, the Council specified that UNOWAS would support countries in the subregion in which the United Nations presence was undergoing reconfiguration and transition through conflict prevention and peace consolidation efforts, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other actors, in close cooperation with the Regional Collaborative Platform and United Nations country teams in the region.¹⁶⁵

As part of the efforts of UNOWAS to build regional partnerships under the second objective, the Council requested the office to be mindful of the need for coordination with and between ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in raising awareness and promoting integrated and holistic subregional and cross-border responses to emerging threats to peace, security and stability.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Council requested UNOWAS to support the development of networks of practitioners and subregional frameworks and mechanisms to address challenges related to, among other issues, conflict concerning natural resources management, as well as piracy and other forms of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea.¹⁶⁷ The Council further tasked UNOWAS with collating and analyzing data on or

¹⁶² [S/2023/70](#), annex, objectives 1-4.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, function 1.1.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, function 1.2.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, function 1.3.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, function 2.1.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, function 2.2.

conducting regional research on and gender-sensitive analysis of, transnational issues relevant to peace and security and, in addition to humanitarian action and sustainable development, their links to human rights.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, the Council requested UNOWAS to facilitate United Nations system-wide integrated collaboration and coordination at the regional level, including through joint gender-sensitive analysis, planning and strategy development through a cross-pillar approach.¹⁶⁹ Under the third objective, the Council noted that UNOWAS would draw upon the prevention and sustaining peace agenda and work with the Regional Collaborative Platform, as well as the United Nations resident coordinators and country teams in the subregion to contribute to an integrated analysis and joined-up action to tackle increasingly complex and interrelated peace and security dynamics in the region.¹⁷⁰ Finally, the Council provided that the work of UNOWAS on the promotion of social cohesion and inclusive dialogue would include facilitating the full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women, young people and other relevant stakeholders.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., function 2.3.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., function 3.2.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., function 3.3.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., function 4.1.

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

By resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#) of 3 June 2020, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for an initial period of 12 months, in the context of the drawdown and exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).¹⁷² The Council decided that UNITAMS, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure in the Sudan, would have four strategic objectives, namely to assist the political transition in the Sudan, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; to support peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements; to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Two Areas); and to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

In 2023, the Council adopted resolutions [2685 \(2023\)](#) of 2 June and [2715 \(2023\)](#) of 1 December in connection with the mandate of UNITAMS. By resolution [2685 \(2023\)](#), in the context of ongoing discussions on the future of the Mission, the Council unanimously decided to extend its mandate for five months, until 3 December 2023, as contained in resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) and as previously extended by resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#).¹⁷³

By resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#), the Council took note of the letter of the Government of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General,¹⁷⁴ requesting the termination of the mandate of UNITAMS, and decided to terminate the mandate under resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), as of 3 December.¹⁷⁵ Resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#) was adopted with 14 votes in favour and an abstention by the Russian Federation.¹⁷⁶

By resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#), the Council requested UNITAMS to immediately start on 4 December the cessation of its operations and the process of the transfer of its tasks, where

¹⁷² Resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNITAMS, see previous supplements covering the period from 2020-2022. For more information on the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, see part I, sect. 7.

¹⁷³ Resolution [2685 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁷⁴ See [S/2023/884](#).

¹⁷⁵ Resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁷⁶ See [S/PV.9492](#). In her statement after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation maintained that the resolution had become an instrument for exerting pressure on Khartoum and disagreed with the provision stipulating that, in the absence of representatives of the mission on territory of Sudan, a report should be prepared on the situation in the country.

appropriate and to the extent feasible, to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, with the objective of completing this by 29 February 2024.¹⁷⁷ The Council further decided that the liquidation of UNITAMS would commence on 1 March 2024 and called on the Mission to establish with the United Nations country team, as appropriate, financial arrangements enabling the United Nations to oversee the residual activities of programmatic cooperation previously initiated by the Mission. The Council decided to authorize, for the duration of the transition and liquidation, the retention of necessary security personnel from within existing footprint in Sudan to protect UNITAMS personnel, facilities and assets and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed about these processes.¹⁷⁸ The Council welcomed the appointment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan to use his good offices with the parties and the neighboring States, complementing regional peace efforts, including those of the African Union and IGAD, and called on all parties to extend their cooperation in furtherance of his tasks.¹⁷⁹ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a written report in 90 days, and then brief the Council every 120 days on United Nations efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability, and to keep this reporting under review.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Resolution [2715 \(2023\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

Americas

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace of 24 November 2016 between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP.¹⁸¹

In 2023, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2673 \(2023\)](#) of 11 January, [2694 \(2023\)](#) of 2 August and [2704 \(2023\)](#) of 30 October in connection with the Verification Mission. By resolution [2704 \(2023\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of the Mission for a period of one year, until 31 October 2024.¹⁸²

By resolution [2673 \(2023\)](#), taking note of the shared request of the Government of Colombia and the former FARC-EP, and having considered the recommendations and proposals of the Secretary-General regarding additional tasks as set out in his letter of 9 December 2022, the Council expanded the mandate of the Verification Mission to include the monitoring of the implementation of Section 1 on comprehensive rural reform and Section 6.2 on the Ethnic Chapter of the Final Agreement.¹⁸³

By resolution [2694 \(2023\)](#), taking note of the request from the Government of Colombia and the recommendations and proposals of the Secretary-General set out in his letter of 13 June, the Council further expanded the mandate of the Verification Mission to include the monitoring and verification of the implementation of the ceasefire as outlined in the Second Cuba Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional

¹⁸¹ For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see previous supplements covering the period 2016-2022. For more information on the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))", see part I, sect. 13.

¹⁸² Resolution [2704 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁸³ Resolution [2673 \(2023\)](#), fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs and para. 1. See also [S/2022/787](#) and [S/2022/940](#).

(ELN).¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, to that end, the Council also authorized up to 68 additional international observers to the Mission's existing complement, as well as an appropriate component taking into account existing resources where possible.¹⁸⁵ By the same resolution, the Council expressed its willingness to consider mandating the Verification Mission to monitor and verify the implementation of a ceasefire agreement between the Government and the armed group that called itself Estado Mayor Central when the Secretary-General confirmed that a ceasefire including appropriate verification protocols had been reached.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Resolution [2694 \(2023\)](#), para. 1. See also [S/2023/406](#) and [S/2023/438](#).

¹⁸⁵ Resolution [2694 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

By resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) of 25 June 2019, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). BINUH was mandated to advise the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; preserving and advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and promoting and protecting human rights. BINUH was further tasked with assisting the Government in planning and executing free, fair and transparent elections; reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police; developing an inclusive approach to reduce community violence; addressing human rights abuses and violations and complying with international human rights obligations; improving penitentiary administration management and oversight of prison facilities; and strengthening the justice sector.¹⁸⁷

In 2023, by resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) of 14 July, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of BINUH in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of one year, until 15 July 2024.¹⁸⁸

By the resolution, the Council introduced some modifications to the mandate of BINUH. Specifically, the Council requested BINUH to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, the Council encouraged the Mission, in close cooperation with relevant United Nations agencies, regional organizations, subregional organizations and international financial institutions, to explore options to enhance the Haitian criminal justice sector in order to fight impunity.¹⁹⁰ The Council encouraged continued close collaboration and enhanced coordination between BINUH, the United Nations country team in Haiti, regional organizations and subregional organizations and international financial institutions with a view to helping the Government to take responsibility to realize the long-term stability, sustainable development, economic self-sufficiency and, in this instance newly adding,

¹⁸⁷ For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see previous supplements covering the period 2019-2022. For more information on the situation concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 12.

¹⁸⁸ Resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

food security.¹⁹¹ In addition, the Council requested BINUH to cooperate with the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and its Panel of Experts to facilitate the Panel's work.¹⁹²

The Council also adjusted the composition of BINUH by increasing the size of the police and corrections unit from 42 to up to 70 civilian and seconded personnel to serve as police and corrections advisors and to scale up its strategic and advisory support to the training and investigation capacities of the Haitian National Police.¹⁹³ The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a written report to the Council, in consultation with Haiti, within 30 days, outlining the support options that the United Nations could provide to enhance the security situation, including the support for a non-United Nations multinational force.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Ibid., para. 11.

¹⁹² Ibid., para. 8.

¹⁹³ Ibid., para. 2.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., para. 18. See [S/2023/596](#).

Asia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 with the core mandate to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, as well as to promote national reconciliation and rapprochement through its good offices and manage all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁵

In 2023, by resolution [2678 \(2023\)](#) of 16 March, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMA as defined in resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#) for a period of one year, until 17 March 2024, without any modification.¹⁹⁶ By the resolution, the Council stressed the critical importance of a continued presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes across Afghanistan, and called upon all relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities as needed, as well as international actors to coordinate with the Mission in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ By resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested UNAMA to, inter alia, coordinate and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, provide outreach and good offices with a focus on promoting inclusive, representative participatory and responsive governance, promoting responsible governance and the rule of law, engaging stakeholders on the protection of human rights and monitoring and reporting on human rights, and supporting regional cooperation. For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2000-2022. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

¹⁹⁶ Resolution [2678 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,¹⁹⁸ at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#).

¹⁹⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous supplements covering the period 2007-2022.

Middle East

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#) in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.²⁰⁰ Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.²⁰¹

In 2023, by resolution [2682 \(2023\)](#) of 30 May, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMI for a period of one year, until 31 May 2024.²⁰² By the resolution, the Council reiterated that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, were to continue to prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation, taking into account civil society input, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, also adding the need to take into account both civil society and youth input.²⁰³

The Council also made several modifications to the mandate of UNAMI with regard to electoral preparation, security sector reform, humanitarian support, and regional dialogue and cooperation. Specifically, the Council requested the Mission to advise, support and assist the Government, the Independent High Electoral Commission and other Iraqi institutions with efforts to strengthen electoral preparation and processes to ensure free and fair elections, including provincial elections and the Kurdistan region of Iraq parliamentary elections.²⁰⁴ UNAMI was requested to ensure that its support to security sector reform included support to strengthening age appropriate and gender-responsive reintegration programmes for former

²⁰⁰ See [S/2003/715](#).

²⁰¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous supplements covering the period 2003-2022. For more information on the situation concerning Iraq, see part I, sect. 23.

²⁰² Resolution [2631 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (a).

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (b)(i).

members of armed groups.²⁰⁵ With respect to the Mission's support for regional dialogue and cooperation, the Council provided that this should include dialogue on the clearance of landmines, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war.²⁰⁶ The Council also requested UNAMI to promote, support and facilitate the coordination and implementation of programmes to improve Iraq's capacity to provide effective essential civil and social services, including psychosocial support services for its people and to continue to support Iraq's regional and international donor coordination towards strengthening national ownership.²⁰⁷ In addition, regarding UNAMI's support for the safe, timely, orderly, voluntary and dignified return or local integration, the Council specified would also pertain to displaced Iraqis in the Syrian Arab Republic.²⁰⁸ Finally, while reiterating the need for UNAMI to approach gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, the Council specified that this should include consulting with diverse women's civil society groups.²⁰⁹

Regarding the future of UNAMI, while noting the request of the Government of Iraq to that effect, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in line with best practices, to conduct and provide no later than 31 March 2024, an independent strategic review of the mission, in consultation with the Government, in addition to United Nations agencies, Member States, regional organizations, independent experts and civil society, and the Government of Kuwait.²¹⁰ The Council noted that the independent strategic review would include: (a) an assessment of current threats to Iraq's peace and security, the continue relevance of the tasks and priorities of UNAMI, and recommendations to optimize the mandate, Mission structure and staffing; and (b) a further assessment of the options to support the Government in strengthening effective regional cooperation on issues outlined in the resolution.²¹¹

²⁰⁵ Ibid., para. 2 (b)(iii).

²⁰⁶ Ibid., para. 2 (b)(iv).

²⁰⁷ Ibid., para. 2 (c)(ii).

²⁰⁸ Ibid., para. 2 (c)(i).

²⁰⁹ Ibid., para. 2 (e).

²¹⁰ Ibid., para. 3.

²¹¹ Ibid., para. 3 (a)-(b).

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.²¹² The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.²¹³ The Special Coordinator was tasked with coordinating the work of the United Nations in the country and representing the Secretary-General on all political aspects of the Organization's work. The Special Coordinator was also responsible to ensure that the activities of the United Nations country team in Lebanon were well coordinated with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.²¹⁴

²¹² [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

²¹³ See [S/2000/718](#).

²¹⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous supplements covering the period 2004-2022. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 21. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see part I., sect. 22.

United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

The Security Council established the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) by resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#) of 16 January 2019 to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA succeeded the work of an advance team which was established by resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 and deployed to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA was mandated to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces; to work with the parties so that security was assured by local security forces; and to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.²¹⁵

In 2023, by resolution [2691 \(2023\)](#) of 10 July 2023, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMHA for a period of one year, until 14 July 2024.²¹⁶

By the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of the Mission without any modification. The Council requested the Secretary-General to present a further review of UNMHA, at least one month before the Mission's mandate was due to expire.²¹⁷ The Council also expressed its intention to review the mandate and make any necessary adjustments as may be required by developments on the ground, including inter alia, a durable nationwide ceasefire.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see previous supplements covering the period 2019-2022. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 21.

²¹⁶ Resolution [2691 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 4.